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Abstract
We document systematic and significant time variation in the profiles of lifecycle con-
sumption expenditures in the US. Lifecycle consumption profiles have consistently become
flatter through time. Pooling data across different periods to identify consumption profiles
masks relevant time variation and may artificially generate the well known hump-shaped
consumption age profile. We also identify the effect of perceived housing wealth on li-
fecycle consumption profiles. Housing influenced lifecycle consumption particularly from
2006 onwards and for older households. We propose mechanisms that may account for
the estimated results employing an overlapping generations model with perceived housing
wealth and time varying borrowing constraints.
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1. Introduction
The lifecycle profile of consumption, defined as the curve that depicts the level of consumption
across ages, has been studied in the seminal paper of Deaton and Paxson (1994) and more
recently by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013). The con-
sensus view is that consumption expenditures are hump-shaped and peak around the age of 55
and fall at the later part of the lifecycle.
While analysing lifecycle consumption patterns, a commonly made implicit assumption is
that individual age groups (say 35 years old) behave in an identical fashion and face identical
age specific structural economic conditions across time. Data is thus pooled across time in order
to identify the lifecycle profile of consumption. We believe this approach is misleading. Given
changes in macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions, in the technological environment
and mode of production, in demographic structures and in the evolution of asset prices, the
consumption decisions of 35 years old individuals in 1999 and in 2015 are bound to be different.
Hence, we relax this assumption and study whether lifecycle consumption profiles are time
varying.
We study consumption expenditures using a longitudinal panel of US households for the
period 1998-2014 that allows us to determine the age effects after controlling for household
characteristics. First by pooling all the data and ignoring age-time variation we confirm non-
durable consumption expenditures display lifecycle properties and are hump-shaped in line with
the literature (e.g. Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013)). We then allow
for age and time interactions and document that there are systematic and significant time
variations in lifecycle consumption expenditures of households in the US in the sample period
we study (1998-2014). We show that the difference between consumption expenditures across
ages has declined and lifecycle consumption profiles became flatter over time. Our findings
also suggest that in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis lifecycle consumption pro-
files became downward sloping in age groups. These results are robust to longer longitudinal
data covering the period 1980-2014, to altering the size of age groups (necessary to identify
age effects when time and age fixed effects are included), including household level economic
controls (income and housing wealth), excluding households who do not own a house, including
controls for cohorts and to different ways of adjusting for family size. Thus our first finding is
that pooling data across different periods to identify consumption profiles masks significant and
economically relevant time variation and may artificially generate the well known hump-shaped
lifecycle consumption profiles.
Second, we quantify the effect of subjective housing wealth on age-time specific consumption
profiles, and whether changes in housing market may be driving some of the observed lifecycle
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time variation. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) argue that incorporating durable
consumption, particularly housing, is important to reconcile theoretical models of lifecycle con-
sumption to the data. Moreover, recent papers have stressed the role of house prices and wealth
to changes in consumption expenditures. For instance, Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra
(2018) show that house price variations affect consumption expenditures; Favilukis, Ludvigson,
and Nieuwerburgh (2017) study the macroeconomic effects of housing wealth, stressing the role
of credit constraints in the last two decades and Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2017) look
at the impact of booms and busts in house prices and stress the role of beliefs about future
housing demand affecting consumption and housing markets. Most of this research, although
incorporating heterogenous agents, focus on changes in aggregate consumption. Our focus is
on the effect of housing wealth on age specific consumption profiles, and whether changes in
housing market may be related to the time variation we observe. As argued by Manski (2004)
econometric analysis of decision making based on choice data (i.e. consumption expenditures)
should be complemented with other data, such as self-reports of expectations. To this end
we use subjective house values or subjective home equity information as reported by house-
holds and allow for the age-time specific component in consumption expenditures not related
to household characteristics and household income to vary depending on the subjective house
values. First, we continue to observe time-varying lifecycle behaviour of each age group when
we control for housing wealth. Although incorporation of housing wealth significantly affects
consumption profiles and improves model fitting, it does not influence the flattening of life-
cycle patterns result. Second, we observe that higher house values are associated with higher
consumption expenditures across age groups and time, with the strongest effect observed after
2006 and for older households.
Finally, we investigate whether an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic income
shocks and time varying borrowing constraints can account for the two patterns of lifecycle
consumption we observe. We first show that relaxing borrowing constraints allows households
to smooth consumption throughout their lives and hence generates flatter lifecycle consumption
profiles. Second, we can theoretically match our empirical results that indicate low consumption
response out of subjective housing wealth before the Global Financial Crisis, when house prices
were increasing, and high response of consumption out of housing wealth in the period after
2007 with lower expected house price increases when the accumulated housing wealth sustained
consumption, particularly for older households. In a simple theoretical framework, expected
changes in house prices (as in Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2017)) are able to generate
the relationship we observe between consumption profiles and housing when the incentive to
increase housing investment due to higher expected returns is stronger than the income effect
generated by the current rise in the subjective housing wealth. However, without further
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frictions such models cannot account for the observed heterogeneity across ages, for instance
housing wealth effect on consumption being higher for older households. To account for this age
heterogeneity, we develop a model where gain-losses from subjective ‘housing wealth’ are part
of the household’s utility (Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), Pagel (2017)): an additional
mechanism relating the expected path of house prices to the profile of lifecycle consumption.
In particular, when the uncertainty surrounding house prices increases, households tend to
consume more out of their subjective housing wealth. This effect is stronger for older households,
as younger households consumption and housing investment decisions reflect the dynamics in
the housing market for longer periods, when the reference level of housing wealth adjusts.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Data, the econometric methodology
and results are presented in Section 2. In Section 2.2. we present our benchmark time-varying
lifecycle results. Section 2.3. presents the relationship between subjective house valuation and
lifecycle consumption profiles. The theoretical model is discussed in Section 3. Finally, Section
5. concludes.
2. Empirical Evidence
We study consumption expenditure using a longitudinal panel of US households that allows us to
determine the age effects after controlling for household characteristics, income and perceived
housing wealth. We then consider whether age effects depend on housing wealth, analysing
how housing has altered lifecycle consumption patterns. We start by presenting the data, then
discuss the methodology and main results.
2.1. Data
Data are from the nationally representative longitudinal US household survey, the Panel Study
for Income Dynamics (PSID). The survey was conducted annually from 1968 to 19971 and
biannually thereafter. It contains rich and detailed information on household employment,
income, consumption, assets and various household characteristics such as health status and
social behaviour of around 5000 households (about 18,000 individuals) and their descendants
with the addition of new households to maintain a nationally representative sample.2
Non durable consumption expenditures, Ci,t, is defined as the sum of imputed rent, house
1Each wave of the survey asks households about the previous year’s expenditures. We follow convention by
labelling each wave, t as time period t − 1. This means that information gathered in the 2003 wave will be
labelled in the data set as 2002.
2For a full explanation of sample selection see appendix A
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insurance, utilities, non durable vehicle costs, childcare, education costs, health insurance, non
durable transport costs such as parking, cabs and public transport, medical expenses, food at
home, food away from home and the cash value of food stamps.3
The Benchmark Sample, 1998 - 2014
The benchmark sample, using data from 1998 onwards, capitalises on the expanded con-
sumption questions introduced in 1999 (data labelled 1998). This additional information, listed
above, is used to construct a full measure of non durable consumption. After dropping earlier
data we have 42,720 observations. The average length of household participation in the survey
in this data set is 6.722 waves, with a maximum of 9 waves (40.45 percent) and a minimum of
one wave (3.3 percent). About 66.28% of households in the sample are homeowners.
Long Sample, 1980 - 2014
For robustness purposes we will repeat our analysis over a longer time period. We again use
the PSID, but now include data from 1980 - 1998. The expanded consumption questions were
only introduced in the 1999 wave and till 1997 the PSID collected information only on a few
consumption items: food, home rent and utility payments. We construct an imputed measure
of non durable consumption expenditures following Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014). The im-
putation approach is based on predicting non-food consumption using an approximate demand
system that relates consistently available consumption data (food) to nondurable expendit-
ures. It is only a rough proxy for nondurable consumption expenditures and any prediction
makes assumptions about the stability of relationships between household characteristics and
expenditures that we unfortunately cannot test. To limit uncertainty, we choose 1980 as our
earliest data point. A final adjustment is to drop all odd years to match the biennial structure
of the survey after 1998. The final sample consists of 71,662 observations with an average house-
hold participation length of 5 waves (or 10 years as we retain biennial waves), a maximum of
17 (16.68 percent), and a minimum of 1 period (2.58 percent). In the long sample homeowners
make up about 67.18% of the households.
The consumption data are deflated by using two different methods. The first method uses
expenditure category specific price indices in order to account for relative price variations and is
applied in the short data set. The second more commonly used method utilises the simple CPI
3As is standard in the literature, these expenditures act as a proxy for consumption. In fact, it underestimates
the true amount by not accounting for consumption of leisure, home production and durable goods but assumes
separable utility between between these groups. Estimating the age profile over different categories; total
consumption expenditures, non durable and durables all yield the hump shape. (Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2007)). The issue of defining durables and non durable goods. Mankiw (1982) points out that
durables and nondurables differ only in their rate of depreciation and that some non durables, for example,
clothing, are partly durable. So if the weight of durability relates to the type of consumption then the mix
matters. Also, simply removing perceived durables is not sufficient to exclude durability altogether.
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across all expenditure categories. We use CPI to deflate the long data set that is imputed. We
show that results are robust to either deflation method. Finally, in addition to controlling for
the number of adults and number of children with dummies we use OECD equivalence scales
to adjust the consumption measure to reflect family size ((Blundell, Browning, and Meghir,
1994)). We show our results are robust to using only dummies to correct for family size as in
Aguiar and Hurst (2013).
In some specifications we include a control for income. The PSID dataset includes a number
of measures of income and earnings. We define total family money income Yi,t as the sum of
taxable family income, family transfers and social security benefits. Taxable family money
income is the sum of the husband’s asset income (dividends, interest, rental income and asset
income from farm business), the wife’s asset income, and the husband and wife’s labour income.
Family transfer income consists of transfer income for family members other than husband and
wife and aid to dependent children. We rescale income measure by using the OECD method.
(See the Appendix for details.)
Figure 1 displays unconditional consumption expenditures and income for all households
and for homeowners sorted by all ages pooled over the sample period 1998-2014 similar to
the ones presented in Aguiar and Hurst (2013). We observe a clear hump-shaped profile in
both consumption expenditures and income peaking roughly around the age of 55. Given our
interest in the effect of housing wealth in influence lifecycle patterns we also plot the income
and consumption profile for homeowners. While homeowners do have a higher income than
the overall population and their consumption expenditures are uniformly higher, consumption
expenditures display similar statistical properties over the lifecycle as the sample population
when the survey data is pooled.
Finally, at a later stage we include various controls for subjective housing wealth. We
consider two proxies for the subjective value of the housing wealth. Our first subjective home
value proxy is based on the responses of homeowners to a question in the PSID survey and
reported in housing, mortgage distress and wealth data. Ever since the PSID began home-
owners are asked what value they attach to their home. Specifically homeowners are asked:
‘A20. Could you tell me what the present value of (your/their) (apartment/mobile
home/house) is (including the value of the lot if (you/they) own the lot)–I mean
about how much would it bring if (you/they) sold it today?’
The question offers an insight into subjective expectations of households about their per-
ceived wealth over a 50 year time period. Household responses to this question define our
subjective variable Hi,t=Subjective Current Home Value.
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Figure 1: Unconditional Consumption Expenditures and Income by Age
How well do household’s subjective home values match prices in the market? In Figure 2 we
compare average values in our sample to the Case-Shiller House Price Index.4 The two series
have a correlation coefficient in the order of 0.96. The relationship holds across house values
by income groups; house values in the 10th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles have a similar
correlation value to the overall value.
Our second subjective home value proxy measures the subjective home equity of the house-
hold by netting out home related debt from the total house valueHi,t using the PSID information
on the outstanding mortgage debt associated with primary homes. We define the Subjective
Net Home Equity (HEi,t) as the difference between the subjective house value Hi,t and the
outstanding mortgage debt (MDi,t). HEi,t can take negative values.
5 The relevant questions
4This is compiled from repeat sales values of houses in the US across nine census divisions.
5From 1993 this is extended to include additional mortgages on the same home. Around 200 households
have these second mortgages in any year. Because the proportion is small (about 10%) we do not include
additional (third, forth etc) mortgages in this data set. Until 1993 mortgage costs were an annual amount.
Since then, monthly, and we adjust accordingly to calculate an annual mortgage cost. This question is not
included years 1972- 1974, 1981, 1978 - 1988 and 1997. Households with no mortgage, or which have paid
off their mortgage, have a value zero. Together with home insurance and property tax, mortgage costs are
an alternative way of thinking about the costs and benefits of home ownership. Using Mortgage costs rather
than imputed rent in expenditures addresses non linear distortions across the income distribution, implicit in the
imputed rent calculation. For example, a wealthy household which has inherited property, may pay no mortgage
but imputation assigns a cost based on the value of the property. US mortgage rates are determined by the ’back
end ratio’ and ’front end ratio’. The ratios are decreasing in income and increasing in house purchase value. If
house value and income are not perfectly correlated, interest rates won’t be either. Wealthy households may
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Figure 2: Subjective House Value and Case Shiller Index
are:
‘A23. Do you have a mortgage or loan on this property?’ ‘A24. About how much
is the remaining principal on this loan?’ ‘A25. How much are your monthly loan
payments?’
Figure 3A displays share of homeowners with positive and negative subjective home equity
from mid-80’s. While most homeowners anticipate a positive home equity throughout the
sample period, the share of homeowners reporting a negative equity reached to almost %7 in
2010 and their share drops thereafter. We include both positive and negative home equity in
our estimations6.
2.2. Lifecycle Consumption Profiles
We estimate the lifecycle profile of consumption expenditure using the panel specified where
the log of non durable consumption expenditure ci,t for household i = 1, ..., N at time t =
have proportionately lower mortgage payments; because their debt to income ratios are lower and so they face
lower interest rates. A correlation between low income and other debts will add to this distortion, meaning, if
low income households have proportionately higher debt than high income households, they may face a higher
rate on their mortgage. If this is the case it would be expected that the standard deviation for mortgage costs
would be lower than imputed rent (which is a linear function of house value) and we see this after 2000. Imputed
rent is a different idea. It is not the costs faced by households at different income levels. Imputed rent is often
the variable used when computing consumption. This data set allows use of both mortgage costs/actual rent
for renters and imputed rent.
6See the Appendix for the treatment of subjective negative home equity.
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Figure 3: Panel A: Sample percentage of Home Owners with Positive and Negative Home Equity, by
Year. Panel B: Percentage of Home-Owners, by Year.
1998, ..., 2014 depends on a set of household characteristics Zi,t, which include the years of
completed education for the head of the household, race, life-limiting disability, employment
status, marital status, state of residence and home ownership, on a time fixed effect ,DT imei,t ,
capturing time trends or the average business cycle effects for all ages and finally on age effects
described by a group of dummies denoted Agei,g,t to capture lifecycle patterns. Formally, the
benchmark fixed effects specification is
ci,t = α + βg,tAgei,g,t + δtD
T ime
i,t + ψZZi,t + i,t (1)
Agei,g,t =
{
DAgei,g Case 1 - pooled lifecycle
DAgei,g ×DT imei,t Case 2 - time varying lifecycle
We consider two configurations for the age dependent control. In the first, denoted pooled
lifecycle, and in line with the literature (e. g. Aguiar and Hurst (2013)), we assume lifecycle
effects do not change over time, setting Agei,g,t = Agei,g = D
Age
i,g , where D
Age
i,g is a dummy
variable that takes the value one if the age of the head of household i is within the age group g
and zero otherwise. We initially select 4 age groups g = 1, . . . , 4 (24−35, 36−50, 51−65, 65+))
to ensure each age group is well populated but also consider 5 year age groups, with g =
1, . . . , 10 (24 − 30, ..65 − 70, 71+)) for robustness. βg,t = βg in this case captures the log
difference in mean consumption of the youngest age group (reference group) to the other age
groups across the lifecycle for the entire sample period.
In the second, denoted time varying lifecycle, we account for time variation in lifecycle
consumption expenditures by setting Agei,g,t = D
Age
i,g × DT imei,t . In this specification we allow
the consumption allocations not explained by household characteristics and business cycles
effects of a 30 year old to potentially change with time. βg,t in this case captures the log
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difference in mean consumption of the youngest age group (reference group) to the other age
groups across the lifecycle for each wave/year in our sample.
In Figure 4 we display the lifecycle coefficients (βg,t’s) for both specifications for the age effect
variable. The thick dark line shows βg’s from the regression that pools the information across
the entire sample to measure age effects. The results are well known and depict a hump-shaped
pattern of consumption in the lifecycle. The dashed lines display the lifecycle coefficients (βg,t)
for each year (1998, . . . , 2014) separately.7 We observe a systematic time variation in lifecycle
consumption patterns. At the beginning of the sample (1998, 2002) consumption was increasing
in age groups. With time the lifecycle profile pivots down and towards the end of the sample
period (2014) consumption is decreasing in age groups. Using the long sample (from 1980 till
2014) we observe the slope of the consumption profile has been systematically decreasing since
the 1980’s. Our estimates show that the established hump-shaped lifecycle consumption profile
is a result of pooled data and masks significant time variations.
Figure 4: Lifecycle Consumption Patterns
Note: Each dashed line depicts βg,t for each year of the wave of the survey, (1998, . . . , 2014), depicting
the estimated lifecycle pattern of consumption for each year. The dark line depicts the age effects
βg,t when Agei,g,t pools information for the entire sample. The top graph considers 4 age groups,
while the bottom graph show the results for 10 age groups.
In Figure 5 we show the age effects and their 95% confidence interval as a time series (in
7Although qualitatively comparable, β′gs for the pooled age effects regression (thick dark line) are not a
direct function of the β′g,ts estimated for each year/wave (dashed lines).
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the left panel). We plot βg,t by age group, over all time periods to compare within age group
changes, depicting how the coefficients change for each age group across time. To assess the
significance of these changes, we test the hypothesis that the coefficients for each age group do
not change over time, formally H : βg=s,t=1998 = βg=s,t=1998+x, which is an implicit assumption
of the pooled approach. This null hypothesis is rejected in almost all cases (results are displayed
in table 1). We thus observe that age group coefficients, showing the relative difference w.r.t.
the young age group (24-35) for each year, are economically and statistically different from each
other. In Figure 5 (right panel) we present age group coefficients grouped by time. Set out
this way, they represent a sequence of lifecycle consumption profiles. This further illustrates
the decrease in slope of lifecycle consumption profiles, with older age groups observing larger
variations than the young and middle aged households. Lifecycle profiles for each year are also
economically and significantly different from each other. Finally, we compare the information
criteria of the two cases for Agei,g,t, pooled lifecycle versus time varying lifecycles. Because the
latter nests the former model, we can use the information criteria as a likelihood ratio test
with a penalty for complexity. Two popular information criteria, AIC and BIC, favour time
variation in age effects. We also apply this test to the more granular age group specification
and find strong evidence that allowing age effects to vary with time fits that data better than
pooling age effects over time (see Appendix for detail).
Year
Age Group 2002 2006 2010 2014
35 - 50 0.0000 0.0004 0.2046 0.7257
51 - 65 0.9494 0.9167 0.0000 0.0000
> 65 0.6850 0.156 0.0000 0.0000
Table 1: βg,t - Time Variation Statistical Test
Note: We test the hypothesis that the coefficients for each age group do not change over time. Results
are shown for the base year, 1998 against 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014, βg=s,t=1998 = βg=s,t=1998+x.
Finally, we complement our lifecycle estimates for each wave by taking into account the
consumption behaviour of the reference (youngest age) group (24-35) that may be changing
over time. In order to evaluate the potential business cycle effects on the evolution of lifecycle
of the reference group we reestimate the model where the reference group now is 24-35 age
group in 1998 (thus we drop time dummies to avoid perfect collinearity). Figure 6 records the
coefficient estimates for the young age group w.r.t. the 1998 reference year. This exercise is
equivalent to reporting the time dummies δt’s in Equation 1. Consumption expenditures of the
young age group have in general drifted up from 1998 till 2014 (with a large fall and subsequent
recovery due to the most recent crisis). The evidence presented in Figure 6 together with Figure
5 suggests that lifecycle consumption expenditure evolution has at least two dimensions. One
is related to the shifts in the consumption behaviour of the young age group with respect to
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Figure 5: Age group coefficients (βg,t) plotted by age group (Left) and by year (Right).
the business cycle; the other the shifts in the behaviour of older age groups with respect to the
young.
We conclude that the hump-shaped lifecycle patterns as reported by Deaton and Paxson
(1994) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013) are product of considering that lifecycle profiles are time
invariant. We show lifecycle consumption profiles have systematically shifted over the years and
thus pooling the data across all households in sample masks changes in the lifecycle behaviour
of age groups over time.
Table A.9 in the Appendix shows estimation results for the pooled lifecycle model, and the
first two columns of Tables A.10 and A.11 in Appendix shows results for i. time-varying lifecycle
model (Benchmark) ii. time-varying lifecycle model with economic controls (Benchmark with
Income). Here we note that both AIC and BIC information criteria clearly prefers time varying
lifecycle model against the pooled lifecycle model.
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2.2.1. Robustness
We verify the robustness of our results to several specification changes. First, we estimate
the model (1) with a longer sample relying on the imputed consumption data from 1980 until
1998 and the benchmark sample from 1998 onwards. The results show that the time variation
observed in the cross sectional lifecycle profiles for consumption after 1998 have been observed
since 1980. Given that overall consumption data before 1998 was imputed we also estimated
the model using food consumption. Data on food have been recorded in almost every wave of
the sample since 1968 and thus in this case do not need to rely on imputation. Once again time
variation in lifecycle profiles are confirmed.8
Second, we re-estimate the benchmark model with 10 age groups, g = 1, . . . , 10 (24 −
30, ..65−70, 71+)). The systematic changes in consumption lifecycle patterns remain the same,
thus averaging the behaviour of households across larger age groups does not alter the main
conclusions derived from our empirical evidence.
Third, we additionally control for household’s income (yi,t) and household’s subject value
of housing Hi,t (Economic Controls). The modified econometric model is
ci,t = α + βgtAgei,gt + γyyi,t + γHHi,t + δtD
T ime
i,t + ψZZi,t + i,t (2)
In our econometric specification inclusion of household income also nests permanent income.
The time variation in lifecycle consumption patterns is unchanged and thus the time variation
8Results from the estimation with consumption of food are available from the authors upon request.
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Long Sample, Age/Time Estimations
Figure 7: Age group coefficients: Results from Long Data Set. Top Coefficients by age group.
Bottom Lifecycle plots by year.
in lifecycle patterns are not related to household’s income profiles.
Fourth, we re-estimate the model using only homeowners. Results remain qualitatively the
same.
Finally, we verify the robustness to including a control for cohorts and the robustness to
different ways to adjust for family size, and to deflate consumption expenditures in line with
StAubyn (2018). Additional controls for cohorts (birth year of households) do not alter the res-
ults and thus in the benchmark we select a more parsimonious specification. In the benchmark
model we include dummies for number of adults and children but also scaled consumption to
reflect family size following Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994). We estimate the model
without scalling, including dummies only, and with scaling but excluding dummies, the main
qualitative results are robust to these changes. We test the robustness to different methods of
deflation and find that our results are not driven by our choice of using expenditure category
specific price indexes.
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Age−Time Effects by Age and Year
Lifecycle 1998 2014: Benchmark Model
Figure 8: Age group coefficients: Model with 10 age groups: Left Coefficients by age group.
Right Lifecycle plots by year.
2.3. Lifecycle Consumption: The Role of Subjective House Value
For most households investment in a house (typically purchased via mortgage credit) to live-in
constitutes the largest asset investment in their lifetime. In the US the proportion of homeown-
ers in the PSID sample was close to the national average of around 60%, increasing from 1990 to
2008 and then falling since the financial crisis. (Figure 3B). Several contributions have looked
at the effects of housing wealth in consumption, with most focusing at the marginal propensity
to consume due to changes in housing wealth (e.g. Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011), Ala-
dangady (2017), Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra (2018)). Indeed we plot in Figure
10 business cycle components of US aggregate consumption expenditures and Case-Shiller Na-
tional Home Price Index together. Causal observation suggests that as of early 2000’s there
are clear dynamic co-movements between these two variables with episodes before and after
the Great Recession particularly marked.9 However, our interest is in lifecycle variations of
consumption expenditures across generations. Thus, we focus on how development in housing
markets, through their variation in housing wealth, affect the lifecycle profile of expenditures
of each generation over time.
9The simple dynamic correlation between 12 month lagged Case-Shiller index and consumption expenditures
is in the order of 55%.
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Age−Time Effects by Age and Year
Lifecycle 1998 2014: with Econ Controls
Figure 9: Age group coefficients: Model with additional economic controls: Left Coefficients
by age group. Right Lifecycle plots by year.
In order to extract the role of housing on lifecycle consumption profiles we allow the age-
time specific component in consumption expenditures not related to household characteristics
and household income to vary depending on housing wealth. We thus add to our benchmark
specification a three way dummy Agei,g,tHi,t that incorporates subjective home value (Hi,t) next
to our age-time dummies (note that Hi,t = 0 for households who do not own a house). We also
consider subjective home equity (HEi,t) as a proxy for housing wealth. In order to decompose
the age-time effects to account for the evolution of household specific house values, we define
βi,g,t = θi,g,t + θi,g,H,t (3)
Then, we estimate the following econometric model (denoted SHV model)
ci,t = α + θg,tAgei,g,t + θi,g,H,tAgei,g,tHi,t + γyyi,t + γHHi,t + δtD
T ime
i,t + ψ1Zi,t + i,t (4)
as such, age-time dummies (θi,g,t) aim to capture consumption expenditures that cannot be
explained by household characteristics, economic controls and the effect of household and age
specific time-varying subjective house price evolution. We report the results in Figures 11 and
12 and in the last four columns in Tables A.10 and A.11 in the Appendix. The top panel of
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Figure 10: Business Cycle Components of Consumption and Case-Shiller House Price Index
Figure 11 plots age-time coefficient estimates for the benchmark model, together with the SHV
model (both with income controls) as a time series sorted by age group. The bottom panels plot
the three-way estimates, θi,g,H,t, age time dummies interacted with log subjective house value.
Figure 12 show the same arrangement but with the coefficients as cross sectional lifecycle plots
by year. In all cases the top panels have two y axis to help make visual comparisons between
the age time coefficients from the benchmark and the SHV model.
As before we interpret the top panels of Figures 12 representing the lifecycle profiles of
nondurable consumption. Several comments are in order. We still observe time-varying lifecycle
behavior of each age group when we control for age-time specific house valuation. Consumption
profiles continue to become flatter through time. The bottom panels of Figures 12 display three-
way (age-time-house value) dummy variables coefficient estimates. The age-time specific house
value parameter is positive for almost all age groups and time; individuals with higher house
values consume more after controlling for household characteristics and income. Therefore,
housing wealth seems to sustain consumption through the lifecycle, particularly for the older
households and after the first half of 2000’s. Figure A.5 in the appendix shows the estimation
results when we restrict the sample to homeowners, results are qualitatively similar.
In the Appendix we also provide a full description of the estimation results for the benchmark
and SHV models. In Tables A.10 and A.11 we compare all six models for all households: i. time-
varying lifecycle model (Benchmark) ii. time-varying lifecycle model with economic controls
(Benchmark with Income), iii. Subjective Home Equity (SHE) model iv. Subjective Home
Equity (SHE with income) model with income controls and v. Subjective House Value (SHV
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Figure 11: Age group coefficients: Benchmark Model (Equation 2) and SHV Model (Equation
4) with Economic Controls, Whole Sample. Top Panel: βgt from Equation 2 (diamond) and
Equation 4 (dot); Bottom Panel: θi,g,H,t, Equation 4
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Figure 12: Lifecycle Profiles: Benchmark Model (Equation 2) and SHV Model (Equation 4)
Economic Controls. Top Panel: βg,t from Equation 2 (diamond) and Equation 4 (dot); Bottom
Panel: θi,g,H,t, Equation 4
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Figure 13: Consumption Drifts in Age Group 24-35
model) vi. Subjective House Value with income controls (SHV model with income). We report
coefficient estimates for age-time dummies as well as estimates for all other controls together
with AIC and BIC information criteria. We first note that both AIC and BIC clearly prefer
SHV model with income against all alternatives. Second, while coefficient estimates for age-
time dummies are mostly significant at 1% in both SHV model and SHV model with income
whereas these are much less so in alternative models. Third, coefficients of income across
models are significant at 1% and economically meaningful. Fourth, while coefficient estimates
for the subjective home equity is not significant in the SHE model with or without income,
the coefficient estimates for subjective house value is significant at 1% and almost three times
of the size of the income coefficient (0.18 against 0.06). In other words, perceived wealth
effects associated with the average subjective house values are much larger than household
income effects for consumption expenditure decisions. Finally, we re-estimate the model using
a sample with only homeowners and report our results in Tables A.12 and A.13 in the Appendix.
Qualitative results are unchanged.
3. Theoretical Analysis
Our empirical evidence suggest that i. lifecycle consumption expenditures are time varying
ii. we observe a flattening of lifecycle consumption over time, iii. housing wealth matters for
consumption expenditures and finally iv. older age groups respond more to changes in perceived
house prices when they decide on their consumption expenditures than the younger age groups.
In this section we theoretically aim to match our findings by using a quantitative OLG model.
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We focus on lifecycle models with borrowing constraints and reference dependent preferences
on housing wealth to rationalise the changes in lifecycle consumption profiles across time and
the role of housing wealth on these profiles observed empirically. We start by presenting a
parsimonious overlapping generations model where we can derived analytical results relating
changes in borrowing constraints and the features of housing markets, particularly the evolution
of house prices across the lifecycle, to consumption. We show that as borrowing constraints
become tighter, lifecycle consumption profiles become steeper. Second, if asset reallocation
towards housing is strong enough to offset income effects, expected house price increases lead
to individuals consuming less out of current housing wealth. Finally, increasing uncertainty
in house prices leads to an increased sensitivity of consumption to current housing wealth. In
addition this effect is stronger for households in the later stages of the lifecycle, matching the
patterns we observe empirically.
3.1. A Parsimonious OLG Model
We present a parsimonious partial equilibrium overlapping generations model with borrowing
constraints and reference dependent preferences on housing wealth. Individuals live for four
periods, matching the four age groups used in our estimations. At each period, an individual in
her z = 1, 2, 3, 4 period of life at time t, given initial levels of liquid assets (az−1,t−1) and housing
(hz−1,t−1), receives labour income (yz,t) and decides for consumption (cz,t), new housing stock
(hz,t) and assets (az,t) to maximize life-time utility. We assume labour income at retirement
falls and thus y4,t < y3,t.
The agent receives utility u(cz,t, hz,t) from consumption and housing set at period t and
experiences a gain-loss utility v(xz,t) from the difference between her housing wealth and a
reference value of housing wealth. Thus, xz,t,t−1 ≡ hz−1,t−1pt− hz−1,t−1prt,t−1, where prt,t−1 is the
reference price of houses and pt the current price. The gain-loss function v(·) relates to the
prospect-theory utility whereby,
v(x) =
{
x, x > 0
λx, x < 0
(5)
with the coefficient of loss-aversion, λ > 1, implying losses outweigh gains. Finally, we assume
that at the end of life the agent may gain utility from leaving a real state bequest to the new
generation, B(hz,t).
Formally, the problem of the individual in her z = 1, 2, 3, 4 period of life at time t is given
by
20
Vz,t = max
cz,t,az,t,hz,t
u(cz,t, hz,t) + ϕzv(xz,t) + Et [β(Vz+1,t+1 + IB(hz,t))] (6)
s.t. cz,t + az,t + pthz,t 6 yz,t + az−1,t−1Rt + pthz−1,t−1 (7)
xz,t = pthz−1,t−1 − prt,t−1hz−1,t−1 (8)
xj,t+j−z,t = pt+j−zhj−1,t+j−z−1 − prt+j−z,thj−1,t+j−z−1 (9)
az,t > − (θpthz,t + φyj+1,t+1) (10)
V5,t+1 = 0, a0,t−1 = 0 (11)
where I is an indicator function taking the value of one when z = 4 and zero otherwise,
ϕz denotes the relative weight of current period gain-loss utility and we set u(cz,t, hz,t) =
ln(cz,t) + ηln(hz,t) with η denoting the relative weight of housing versus consumption in the
utility and B(hz,t) = φln(hz,t). As in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), to avoid non-
stationary as the housing stock grows, we set the scaling factor ϕz = ϕu
′
cz−1,t = ϕ/c¯z−1,t, where
c¯z−1,t is the average consumption of agents of cohort z − 1. Finally, we assume the agent’s
borrowing is limited to a fraction θ of their housing wealth and a fraction φ of next period’s
income. We assume collateralized borrowing is sufficiently restricted such that θ < Etpt+1
Rpt
.
Smaller values of φ and θ imply the individual is more likely to be credit constrained. Let the
Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint be Ξz,t.
Solving the model backwards for each agent, and assuming R − Etpt+1
pt
> 0 such that the
agent might find it optimal to go long liquid assets, we obtain
Table 2: Consumption and Housing in the Lifecycle
Life period Consumption Euler Equation Housing Investment
4 c4,t =
y4,t+Ra3,t−1+h3,t−1pt
1+(η+φβ)
h4,tpt = c4,t(η + φβ)
3 c3,t ≈ Ety4,t+Ry3,t+R
2a2,t−1+Rh2,t−1pt
δ2,t
Etc4,t+1 ≈ c3,tβR h3,tpt = c3,tηδ1,t
2 c2,t ≈ Et(y4,t+Ry3,t)+R
2y2,t+R3a1,t−1+R2h1,t−1pt
δ5,t
Etc3,t+1δ2,t+1 ≈ c2,tβRδ3,t(1−Ξ2,t) h2,tpt = c2,tηδ4,t
1 c1,t ≈ Et(y4,t+Ry3,t+R
2y2,t)+R3y1,t+R3h0,t−1pt
δ8,t
Etc2,t+1δ5,t+1 ≈ c1,tβRδ6,t(1−Ξ1,t) h1,tpt = c1,tηδ7,t
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Where
δ1,t =
[
1− Etpt+1
pt
1
R
− βϕEtv′(x4,t)
pt+1 − prt+1,t
pt
]−1
(12)
δ2,t = Rβ(1 + (η + φβ)) +R +
(
R− Etpt+1
pt
)
ηδ1,t (13)
δ3,t = Rβ(1 + (η + φβ)) +R(1 + η) + βRηδ1,tϕEtv′(x4,t+2,t+1)
pt+2 − prt+2,t+1
pt+1
δ4,t =
[
(1− θΞ2,t)− Etpt+1
pt
(1− Ξ2,t)
R
− βϕEtv′(x3,t)
pt+1 − prt+1,t
pt
]−1
(14)
δ5,t = R
(
βδ3,t
1− Ξ2,t +R +
(
R− Etpt+1
pt
)
ηδ4,t
)
(15)
δ6,t = R
2β2(1 + (η + φβ)) +R2(1 + β)(1 + η) + βR2ϕEtv′(x3,t+2,t+1)
pt+2 − prt+2,t+1
pt+1
ηδ4,t + . . .
+β2R2ϕEtv′(x4,t+3,t+2)
pt+3 − prt+3,t+2
pt+2
ηδ1,t
δ7,t =
[
(1− θΞ1,t)− Etpt+1
pt
(1− Ξ1,t)
R
− βϕEtv′(x2,t)
pt+1 − prt+1,t
pt
]−1
(16)
δ8,t = R
(
βδ6,t
1− Ξ1,t +R
2 +R
(
R− Etpt+1
pt
)
ηδ7,t
)
(17)
We focus on two main drivers of changes to lifecycle consumption profiles and their relation-
ship with housing wealth. The first are changes in the credit constraints. Several papers have
emphasized the role of relaxing borrowing constraints for the macroeconomy (e.g. Campbell
and Hercowitz (2009) for welfare and accumulation of debt, Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Nieuwer-
burgh (2017) for house prices and Cox and Ludvigson (2018) for an empirical comparison of
the effects of credit standards against beliefs on house prices). Our focus is on their effect on
the lifecycle consumption profile. The second are variations in the perceived distribution of
house prices relative to its reference prices, which are related to the growing literature that
focuses on beliefs about the housing market as drivers of the recent boom and bust in house
prices (e.g. Mian and Sufi (2009), Mian and Sufi (2017) and Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante
(2017)). We discuss the potential role of increases in expected house prices and of changes in
the distribution of house prices in altering the propensity to consume out of housing wealth
across different ages.
The first proposition shows that a tightening (relaxation) of exogenous borrowing/lending
standards leads to steeper (flatter) consumption profiles over the lifecycle.
Proposition 1. If income is not expected to fall during the working life of the individual,
a tighter exogenous credit constraint (φ and θ decrease) leads to a steeper lifecycle profile of
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consumption.
Proof
First, as ∂Ξ1
∂φ
, ∂Ξ1
∂θ
, ∂Ξ2
∂φ
, ∂Ξ2
∂θ
6 0, then ∂E
c3
c2
∂φ
,
∂E c3
c2
∂θ
6 0. Second, if income is not expected to
fall during the working life of the individual, then 1−Ξ1
1−Ξ2 6 1. Given the restriction on θ, then
∂δ5(1−Ξ1)
∂φ
, ∂δ5(1−Ξ1)
∂θ
>0, and thus
∂E c3
c2
∂φ
,
∂E c2
c1
∂θ
6 0.
We note that our empirical observation of systematic flattening of lifecycle consumption profiles
are consistent with the relaxation of credit constraints individuals face when agents smooth
consumption over their lifecycle.
The next proposition focuses on changes in beliefs about future house prices as potential
drivers of some of the empirical results; particularly consumption out of subjective housing
wealth are smaller during a housing boom and it increases towards and after the housing bust
as long as the asset reallocation effect is stronger than the income/wealth effect.
Proposition 2. If the expected house prices at period t+1 increase, consumption out of housing
wealth are affected by two opposing forces. On the one hand, housing becomes a better asset
than liquid assets and agents will be willing to reduce consumption in order to increase housing
investment; hence consumption out of subjective housing wealth falls. On the other hand, as
houses are expected to gain in value in the future, agents will expect to be wealthier in the future
and increase consumption in the current period.
Proof
If Etpt+1
pt
increases, housing investment becomes a better asset relative to liquid assets, and
thus for the same level of consumption individuals will be willing to increase their housing
investment. As they do so, they end up consuming less out of current housing wealth. This
occurs for agents in the first three periods of life. Formally, we have that
Increase in Housing Investment Indirect Effect on Consumption out of Wealth
∂δ1,t
∂Etpt+1/pt
=
δ21,t
R
> 0
∂δ2,t
∂δ1,t
=
(
R− Etpt+1
pt
)
η > 0
∂δ4,t
∂Etpt+1/pt
=
δ24,t(1− Ξ2,t)
R
> 0
∂δ5,t
∂δ4,t
= R
(
R− Etpt+1
pt
)
η > 0
∂δ7,t
∂Etpt+1/pt
=
δ27,t(1− Ξ1,t)
R
> 0
∂δ8,t
∂δ7,t
= R2
(
R− Etpt+1
pt
)
η > 0
As δ2,t, δ5,t and δ8,t increase, individuals consume less out of current housing wealth. This
negative effect on consumption out of current housing wealth is due to the asset reallocation
effect. Nonetheless, the increase in Etpt+1
pt
also directly affects the desire to consume out of
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current wealth to bring consumption forward to the period when the household is younger and
thus relatively poorer. Thus,
Direct Effect of on Consumption out of Wealth
∂δ2,t
∂Etpt+1/pt
|δ1,t=constant= −ηδ1,t < 0
∂δ5,t
∂Etpt+1/pt
|δ4,t=constant= −Rηδ4,t < 0
∂δ8,t
∂Etpt+1/pt
|δ7,t=constant= −R2ηδ7,t < 0
This positive effect on consumption out of current housing wealth is due to the income/wealth
effect.
Finally, the following propositions illustrate how the news utility in housing wealth es-
tablishes a link between the developments in the housing markets and agent’s consumption
behaviour, helping the model to potentially match the patterns we observe on the role of hous-
ing wealth in consumption after the mid 2000’s in our estimation and their differences across
age groups.
Proposition 3. As the perceived probability that the house prices p˜t+1 will fall bellow the ref-
erence point prt+1,t increases, agents increase consumption out of their current period housing
wealth.
Proof
If p˜t+1 − prt+1,t < 0 , then v′(xz,t) = λ > 1, while when p˜t+1 − prt+1,t > 0 , then v′(xz,t) = 1.
Thus as the probability that p˜t+1− prt+1,t < 0 increases the expected change in gain-loss utility,
Etv′(xz,t)(p˜t+1− prt+1,t), falls. That implies δ1,t, δ4,t and δ7,t decrease. As such ∂cz,t∂hz,t−1pt increases
for z = 1, 2, 3.
Proposition 4. If, in addition, reference prices for later periods adjust and the distribution of
future house prices are expected to revert back, such that the probability p˜t+j − prt+j,t+j−1 > 0,
for j > 2, sufficiently increases, the increase in ∂cz,t
∂hz,t−1pt
is larger for higher z. Older agents
consume more out of their housing wealth.
Proof
If the probability that p˜t+j − prt+j,t+j−1 > 0, for j > 2 increases, then Etv′(x3,t+2,t+1)(p˜t+2 −
prt+2,t+1) and Etv′(x4,t+j+1,t+j)(p˜t+j+1 − prt+j+1,t+j) for j = 2, 3 increase. If these increases are
24
sufficient to offset the negative effect of the decrease in δ1,t, δ4,t, then δ3,t and δ6,t increase, with
a stronger effect on δ6,t. As a result, at time t,
∂c3,t
∂h2,t−1pt
> ∂c2,t
∂h1,t−1pt
> ∂c1,t
∂h0,t−1pt
.
The increased uncertainty in the housing markets may lead agents to adjust their expecta-
tions by increasing the perceived probability in the near future house prices will fall below their
reference level. In this case, consumption is sustained by housing wealth. However, younger
agents may consider that later in their lifecycle house prices will eventually return to the pre-
vious levels with a higher likelihood of price increases, offsetting in part the increase in the
propensity to consume. Thus, older agents respond more to a shock in housing markets, having
a higher sensitivity of consumption to housing wealth.
4. Quantitative Results
TBA
5. Conclusions
We empirically show that hump-shaped lifecycle profile of US consumption expenditures are
an artefact of pooling our sample of 1998-2014. When we account for age time interactions not
only hump-shaped profile disappears but we also document clear time varying trends in lifecycle
consumption patterns that are robust to a battery of data, specification issues, household
characteristics and economic controls. We argue that variations in subjective house prices do
affect consumption expenditures and that the older households respond more forcefully to gains
in house prices than the younger households. Our theoretical framework allows to capture both
time variation and trends in lifecycle expenditures and as to why older households react more
strongly than younger households to variations in house prices.
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A Appendix-Data
Note: For further robustness tests of our results see StAubyn (2018).
i. We begin with household heads of the entire Survey, that is 1968 - 2014; there are
270,578 observations. The initial motivation for the the PSID was the study of low income
households. This original survey is identified as the Survey for Economic Opportunity (SEO).
The Survey Research Centre (SRC) later introduced a sample drawn from all income groups and
representative of the population. This is the known as the SRC survey and a sample initially
of 2,930 households made up this group. In 1990 a new cohort was added to the sample to
correctly represent the level of Latino ((Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican) immigrants in the
population.
Households with income less that zero (64) are dropped. All the variables in the sub sample
are truncated at the top and bottom. We convert variables on the truncation boundary to
missing. Also heads younger than 25 and older than 80 are dropped. Obvious outliers for
food at home, food away from home, food stamps, rent, and from the imputed variable are
dropped. The final sub sample comprises 102,644 observations. There are 11,534 households.
The average time in the sample is 8.3 years with a minimum of one and a maximum of 29 years.
ii. Because a proportion of households are not homeowners many observations of house are
zero. This can mean the house is worth zero, or that the household does not own a home. We
also have data on the value of mortgage principal remaining, Mit = M
1
i,t + M
2
i,t, where M
1
i,t is
the first mortgage and M2i,t is a second, on the same property. Again, the response of zero has
more than one meaning; (1) home owners have paid off their mortgage, or (2) have never had
one or (3) are not home owners. To distinguish between these groups we define the indicator
function 1(..) = 1 if the condition in the brackets is true, 1(..) = 0 otherwise.
We define dummies for no house and no mortgage: IHit = 1(Hit = 0) and IMit = 1(Mit =
0). We then estimate equations of the form
Cit = γi + γ1 ln(Hit + 1) + γ2 ln(Mit + 1) + γ3IHit + γ4IMit + .....
so for those with no housing wealth it is ln(1) = 0 and we do not lose any observations. Predicted
log consumption for a home-owner with a mortgage is
γi + γ1 ln(Hit + 1) + γ2 ln(Mit + 1)
home owner without a mortgage
γi + γ1 ln(Hit + 1) + γ4IMit
renter
γi + γ3IHit + γ4IMit.
We could also interact the dummies with other variables, e.g.
Cit = γi + γ1 ln(Hit + 1) + γ2 ln(Mit + 1) + γ3IHit + γ4IMit + β1yit + β2yitIHit.....
0
iii. Subjective Net Home Equity can take positive HMEQPit, negative values HMEQNit
or zero HMEQZit values. To retain negative values in the log transformation, we define
HMEQPit = 1(HMEQit > 0)×HMEQit,
HMEQZit = 1(HMEQit = 0),
HMEQNit = −1(HMEQit < 0)×HMEQit.
Appendix A.1 Imputation
To estimate imputed nondurable consumption in the pre 1999 data we estimate a log/levels
equation by OLS. Specifically, to estimate imputed non durable consumption in the pre 1998
data we estimate a log/levels equation by OLS in the short sample.
nf it = Z
′
itβk + g(fit; θ) + P
′
tγ
Where
• nfi,t = ln(
∑
k Cit,k) is total non durable, non food expenditures, with Cit,k the expenditure
on non food category k by household i in time t.
• Zit is a vector of socio-economic variables in the food demand equation.
• g is a polynomial function for f , the the total of food at home, away, and the monetary
value of food stamps received. These data are available for all waves except 1981 and
1982.
• P is a vector of annual price indexes; for overall cpi, food at home and food away from
home and rent.
Imputed log total non durable consumption for 1980 - 2014, cˆi,t is then
cˆit = log[foodc + exp(Z
′βˆ + g(fit; θˆc) + P′γˆ)]
B Appendix - Specification Issues
Appendix B.1 Scaling of the Data
As is well documented, family composition influences consumption. Failing to control for family
composition distorts the intertemporal pattern of consumption and over states the relationship
between consumption and income ((Blundell, Browning, and Meghir, 1994)). Scaling for fam-
ily composition explains over half of the the hump shape seen in the data over the lifecycle
((Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2007)). There are different ways of implementing these
controls. One method is to scale consumption using one of the available equivalence scales.
The scales attach different weights to adults and children and, in some cases, account for eco-
nomies of scale also; two adults do necessarily require twice the amount of everything. Each
1
scale has benefits and costs ((Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007))10. Another approach
is to include dummies for numbers of children and adults, or more elaborate versions of this.
(Aguiar and Hurst, 2013) have eleven dummies specifying age groups and gender of children.
One point to note is that although it is clear that controlling for composition is important
in measuring the age profile of consumption, it does not account for the fact that household
composition is endogenous. For example, the arrival of children is not usually a complete sur-
prise, nor is their departure. This information is known somewhat in advance and so probably
influences spending and savings decisions before the econometric control appears.
In the absence of an agreed approach, we estimate equation 1 and 3 with three specifica-
tions for household composition. Information criteria are used to establish the best approach.
1. 20 Dummies are included in the model to allow for the number of children and adults,
but the consumption variable itself is not treated in any way. Attanasio et al (1995) and
Aguiar and Hurst (2015) also allow for age and gender of children.
2. OECD equivalence scales.
These are many equivalence scales to choose from but OECD scales are used in similar
work. To apply this, Ci,t is divided by the scale value, scalei,t = 1 + 0.7(1−ni,t) + 0.5ki,t,
where n is the number of adults and k the number of children. We estimate equations
with log values so
csci,t = ndci,t − ln(scalei,t)
where csci,t = log scaled non durable consumptioni,t and ndci,t is log non durable.
3. Both OECD scale and a full set of dummies are included. The motivation for this config-
uration is that after the log transformation, csci,t is not equivalent to its levels counterpart
Csc =
Ci,t
Scalei,t
and so further controls are needed to capture household composition effects.
Table A.1: Baseline Model. a) Dummies, b) Cohort, c) Both, Short Data Set
a) b) c)
AIC 27312.6 30298.1 27101.6
BIC 28065.6 30921.3 27854.7
df m 86 71 86
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table sets out the information criteria and parameter numbers for each of the three
specifications above. The columns 1 - 3 are results for equation 1, columns 3 - 6, equation 2.
10See http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf or (Attanasio, Banks, Meghir,
and Weber, 1999))
2
Table A.2: Extended Model. a) Dummies, b) Cohort, c) Both, Short Data Set
a) b) c)
AIC 27136.3 30283.6 26932.6
BIC 28027.8 31045.3 27824.1
df m 102 87 102
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The column numbers refer to the specification. The information criteria identify the model of
best fit is specification 3. This is in spite of the cost of the introduction of 15 additional para-
meters compared to specification 2 (scale only).The coefficients on the dummies for number of
children and It also makes sense; the scaling applies a fixed adjustment to each household but
this obviously does completely describe how household composition changes affect consump-
tion.The dummies are more flexible. Specification c is the best approach by information criteria,
although we note that the model does not account for differences in returns to scale for differ-
ent expenditure categories ((Aguiar and Hurst, 2013)) or the endogeneity of family composition.
We can test whether the scaling is correct. Define scale as Si,t =
∑
wiNi, some weight w applied
to household size and composition. Then the equation has the form lnndci,t − ln(scale)i,t =∑
αiNi. Or lnndci,t = γln(
∑
wiNi)i,t +
∑
αiNi. The hypothesis that γ = 1 is not rejected
so imposing the scaling on the dependent variable is acceptable. This equation brings out the
different way that the number in each category influences log consumption; linearly through the
dummies and logarithmically through the scaling. Plotting the coefficient values by year, figure
A.1 makes it easy to see the effects of the the different scaling approaches on the lifecycle con-
sumption estimations. The less restricted approach, c, captures household specific household
composition effects left behind by the more restrictive OECD scaling treatment. (See StAubyn
(2018) for details.)
Appendix B.2 Deflating the Data
In general, consumption data are deflated for lifecycle analysis by a measure such as overall
CPI, or a weighted average of price indices. But some work Aguiar and Hurst (2013) deflates
by price indexes specific to spending category. We check the impact of deflation approach by
these two methods on the lifecycle for consumption and find it has only a small affect on the
outcome ??. In this paper, we use price specific indexes for the short data set and overall cpi
for the long data set, but the results are robust to either approach. WHAT IS ref{sta} THE
?? REFERS TO THIS? WHAT IS IT?
Appendix B.3 Other Specifications
Cohorts When measuring the age profile of consumption, controls should be included for
cohort effects and business cycle effects. The first recognises that some features of lifetime
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Figure A.1: Cross sectional lifecycle plots: scaled versus non scaled plots. The green plots show
estimations over OECD scaled data, no dummies.
consumption are influences specific to year of birth. The second, picks up shocks that affect
the whole population but in a particular time period.
The difficulty here is that cohort+age = year. Deaton and Paxon (1997) devised a method
to make the columns of the time dummies sum to zero, thus making them orthogonal to the
the year effects, t. This is a popular approach and is adopted in much of the literature. 11 We
include the orthogonalised dummies, d∗t in the model instead of the standard time dummies δt
so that we can test the full set of controls. Japelli and Pistaferri state age, cohort and time
effects cannot all be identified without ”imposing non testable assumptions”. 12
Even when controls for all three effects are able to be identified, they only for average effect.
There will be household specific effects (a household with high debt will respond differently to
a rise in interest rates to a household with high savings). There also may be a difference across
ages and this cannot be removed from the estimated age coefficients. For example, the βa in
this case will be stripped of average cohort and time effects all ages. This assumes, for example,
that a macroeconomic shock affects all ages in the same way.
Given the discussion around the time dummies and also the specific features and structure
11To do this, two columns of the time dummies are dropped (coefficients for the first two years can be
recovered) and a set of treated time dummies for t = 3, .., 8,is defined, dropping the year superscript for
simplicity, δ∗t = Dt + (1− t)D2 + (t− 2)D1. Dt are the usual dummies for time that equal 1 when the year is t
and 0 otherwise.
12Note that this control only captures the additive effect of macroeconomic shocks of time (Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2017)), not those where time effects are not additively separable from age. This assumes time effects
are the same for all ages. There are other solutions in the literature. For example McKenzie suggest a second
differencing approach. In this paper, we will begin with cohort, age and follow Deaton and Paxson (1994) with
orthogonalised time.
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of these data, we try a number of specifications of Equations 1 and 2 over the short data set.
For these comparisons we use the consumption deflated by category specific price indexes and
scaled according to approach 3. Our purpose is to select the model with best fit. We try all
variations of time and cohort and age and evaluate each using information criteria. Estimation
is by fixed effects.
cji,t = α + βaAgei,a + γccohorti,t + δtd
∗
t + ψZZi,t + i,t (A.1)
ci,t is the log of non durable consumption, constructed from individual expenditure categories
(set out in 2.1.). cohorti,t is a set of cohort dummies, one for each year of birth, with the last
one (youngest person) dropped. δ∗t are the orthogonalised time dummies, one for each year from
period 3 - 9. To select the best specification we consider the results of this exercise from two
perspectives. First, comparing the age group structure with the age group/time structure us-
ing information criteria as the measure. AIC and BIC are both complexity penalised likelihood
criteria. The main difference between them is the BIC penalty is increasing as a function of
sample size where as AIC is not. A lower value indicates a better model fit. We compute both
for completeness but in this exercise the objective is to compare the different specifications
rather than different information criteria. For the group structure, IC favours time controls
over the other comgroupations. This holds for both the baseline and extended models.
Table A.3: Selecting moldel of best fit using information criteria. We compare outcomes for
different sets of controls over Equation 1, baseline model, Age Bins srtucture. Short Data Set
All Controls Cohort Time
AIC 26956.7 27395.8 26939.4
BIC 28350.2 28728.8 27735.7
df m 160 153 91
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.4: Information Criteria, Age/Time Groups, Short Data Set
All Controls No Time No Cohort
AIC 23250.9 23303.1 23232.6
BIC 24727.0 24719.4 24119.9
df m 172 165 103
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Other Issues
We also consider the contribution of the household characteristics included in Z. The initial
choice follows other work in lifecycle consumption, variables which are known to affect consump-
tion are included, see section 2.2.. All the are significant except education, which is dropped due
5
to multicollinearity. Education dummies denote maximum education level achieved. There are
four of these, the highest is a college degree or higher. The sample has ages 24 to 80. Education
level will only change after the age of 24 either in non standard cases of adult education or,
in the sub set of graduates. Otherwise, after the age 24, there will be no change. Estimation
is by fixed effects. There is not sufficient time variance in the data to estimate the impact of
education level. We thus drop education from the model.
In the final specification we control for time but not cohort, and because of this, can include
standard time dummies, dt, not the orthogonalised version. From the vector Z, education is
dropped. We use data that are scaled by the OECD equivalence scale and also include dummies
for number of children and number of adults.
Appendix B.4 Reference Group
In equations 1 - 2 we want to identify age effects in time. We have g age groups, 1,...,G and t
time periods, 1,..., T.
Agei,gt, is abbreviated as AgTt in this section for ease of notation.
βgt can be interpreted as the log difference in average consumption for each age-time pair,
from the reference group. However, there are different ways to parameterise the age/time and
time effects and this may affect this interpretation. Because the parameters of interest have
two dimensions, age and time, for the reference group we can drop the first age group in the
first time period or we can drop the first age group for all time periods. We want to be able
to interpret the βgt coefficients with reference to their own age group and also in a specific
time period, i.e. across time in groups (time series) and as lifecycles for different years (cross
sections). We estimate both specifications described above and compare the results;
Case A
Leave out age group 1, for all t, include age group 2 - G for all time periods; A2T1 − AGTT .
Include T-1 time dummies, dropping t = 1. There are NT − 1 parameters.
Case B
Leave out age group 1 in time period 1 only, A1T1 and leave out all time dummies. Again
we have NT − 1 parameters. Both cases are estimated. Comparing the results we find the
following:
In case A, the coefficients of the T −1 time dummies δAt , are identical to the coefficients βB1,t
on the A1T2 − A1TT dummies in model B (where time dummies are excluded). That is
δAt+1 = β
B
1,t+1 (A.2)
The coefficient of A2T1, β
A
2,1 in A is identical to the coefficients on A2T1, β
B
2,1 in B.
The coefficient of A2Tt+1 in model B is equal to the the coefficient of A2Tt+1 in model A
plus the coefficient βB1,t+1, which by (A.2) is identical to the time dummy in the corresponding
period in model A
βB1,t+1+i = β
A
1,t+1+i + δ
A
t+1+i
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where i = (0, 1, ..., T − 1)
In both cases, the base case is β1,1 and this acts to scale all the other coefficients.
In case A, the age time coefficients are
βAg,t = βg,t − βB1,t︸︷︷︸
=δAt
−βB1,1 (A.3)
for g = 2, ..., G and t = 2, ..., T
The δt coefficients capture average time effects from the perspective of the omitted age group.
Although the time effects affect all age groups together, they nonetheless are a comgroupation
of year effects and the consumption of the omitted age group; the two cannot be disentangled.
In our example age group 1 is omitted. If a different age group was left out, the value of the
δt’s would be different.
In case B
βBg,t = βg,t − βB1,1 (A.4)
for g = 1, ..., G and t = 2, ..., T
In case B, the age time coefficient includes the value of δt; the average time effect plus the
omitted age group’s consumption.
In summary, from equation (A.3) and (A.4)
βAg,t = β
B
g,t − δAt
for g = 2, ..., G and t = 2, ..., T
βB1,t = δ
A
t
for g = 1, ..., G and t = 2, ..., T
βA2,1 = β
B
2,1
Being clear about the effects of different parameterisations is important for interpretation
of the age-time coefficients. In case A and B, the base group is always the first age group in the
first time period. This is a constant, subtracted from each age-time coefficient from group 2 -
G. The group one coefficients, for the remaining time periods (t+1) - T are a comgroupation of
average time effects and the consumption level of the youngest age group, δt. In case A, these
δt’s are subtracted from the corresponding age - time coefficients, equation (A.4) which can
then be interpreted as a cross sectional lifecycle from the perspective of the youngest age group
in each of the time periods. Alternatively, organised by age group over time, the coefficients
can be interpreted as a time series of consumption by age group from the perspective of the
first time period for that age group. If this were not the case then drawing conclusions about
the evolution of the βgt’s would be less clear. Thus case A is selected, noting that although
we cannot separate time effects entirely, we can at least narrow it down to the an age group
specific response.
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Appendix B.5 Cohorts
We ask an age-time question; is the spending allocation of a 30 year old in 1980 the same as
a 30 year old in 1990? This is the same question as asking if the spending of someone born in
1950 is the same as someone born in 1960 when they are 30, ie in 1980 and 1990.
However, posing it as an age-time question, rather than a cohort - time question, seems more
productive for several reasons. First, it is more parsimonious. Given the life span, there are a
fixed number of ages whereas the number of cohorts keeps increasing. Second, there is quite a
lot of economic theory about the lifecycle, but relatively little about cohort effects. Third, the
lifecycle story can be interpreted more directly. From the mid 1990’s there are relative changes
in consumption allocations between the age groups. We could not observe this from the cohort
perspective.
In the specification tests, set out in appendix Appendix B.3, cohort effects are not significant
and we drop them from the extended model. This is not surprising, each βgt coefficient is an
estimate of the consumption of a cohort in time. Standard cohort dummies will only pick up
the average effect of birth year over an entire lifecycle. Also, the estimation is by fixed effects
so unobserved household effects are removed. This comgroupation of controls does not leave
enough change over time to estimate.
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C Appendix - Summary Statistics
1980 - 1989 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2014
Age of Head 44.60 45.55 46.13
max 80.00 80.00 80.00
min 24.00 24.00 24.00
No. Children 0.88 0.84 0.75
max 7.00 7.00 11.00
min 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married 1.69 1.76 1.77
max 5.00 5.00 5.00
min 1.00 1.00 1.00
Non Home Owner 0.32 0.31 0.34
Grades 0-11 Completed 0.19 0.13 0.10
High School or Equivalent 0.31 0.31 0.27
College Drop Out 0.22 0.24 0.27
BA Degree of Higher 0.28 0.32 0.36
Observations 13369 19855 38438
Table A.5: Household Characteristics
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Table A.6: Real Non Durable Consumption by Age Group
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
24 - 35 12,109 12,960 12,586 12,509 12,330 10,813 11,024 10,688 10,699
6,224 6,827 6,468 7,025 7,044 6,308 6,643 6,283 6,481
31 - 35 14,952 14,918 15,776 16,135 15,340 13,875 14,273 13,388 13,121
7,829 8,966 8,629 10,025 8,715 8,370 8,284 8,268 7,560
36 - 40 16,492 16,918 17,300 18,353 17,993 15,895 15,492 15,210 15,188
9,780 9,032 11,059 12,537 11,361 10,557 9,772 9,408 9,171
41 - 45 17,245 18,580 19,012 18,959 19,002 17,005 17,022 16,369 16,002
9,864 11,659 12,216 12,198 13,947 11,637 10,687 9,639 9,072
46 - 50 19,126 18,775 19,513 20,026 20,508 16,978 16,925 17,261 16,954
12,892 13,122 12,940 14,187 15,298 13,117 11,874 13,878 13,347
51 - 55 19,371 20,495 19,665 20,588 20,140 17,666 17,747 17,059 16,940
14,061 15,609 13,010 15,718 16,465 12,004 13,174 13,761 13,951
56 - 60 15,304 16,805 18,253 20,315 19,451 16,702 17,064 16,059 14,895
9,506 10,242 13,863 16,099 16,305 12,063 12,977 11,691 10,521
61 - 65 15,654 15,973 16,027 16,288 17,503 16,093 16,352 15,230 14,972
12,001 11,446 11,082 9,447 10,843 15,035 16,670 10,209 10,976
66 - 70 13,781 13,653 14,677 16,147 15,807 13,950 14,660 14,733 14,657
8,228 7,854 8,710 10,318 11,467 9,042 9,453 16,379 15,293
> 70 11,723 12,442 12,795 13,178 14,244 12,460 12,288 12,184 12,092
10,568 8,822 8,172 9,812 11,456 8,554 7,801 8,552 8,223
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Table A.7: Total Real Family Income by Age Group
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
24 - 35 26,472 28,579 28,623 27,110 25,958 25,225 23,273 24,733 23,786
18,525 26,338 46,440 20,468 19,398 18,520 17,312 18,558 17,180
31 - 35 38,164 37,163 38,037 38,669 37,956 38,862 35,386 32,552 33,883
30,896 29,797 32,895 38,810 35,495 40,154 36,841 27,099 27,925
36 - 40 42,162 41,723 41,294 44,331 43,872 43,792 38,382 40,146 41,457
39,629 37,455 38,380 47,634 40,232 46,701 31,492 33,316 35,378
41 - 45 45,004 51,042 48,762 54,954 46,405 48,333 45,054 42,817 44,928
41,099 74,500 65,846 146,768 49,703 55,604 50,060 33,966 41,486
46 - 50 53,204 52,214 48,317 45,976 53,023 54,215 43,824 49,191 44,451
70,593 57,083 58,552 44,909 84,803 136,897 46,387 106,080 46,025
51 - 55 50,204 56,268 48,965 52,870 51,782 47,770 48,053 51,619 47,360
45,255 58,959 45,610 66,420 63,110 45,161 66,018 133,927 60,705
56 - 60 41,380 47,214 50,519 52,794 50,841 48,554 48,142 47,252 47,746
35,905 50,371 119,229 91,217 55,658 59,510 62,980 76,541 112,505
61 - 65 40,601 41,845 36,192 41,691 42,660 43,096 44,123 42,358 40,995
59,398 55,893 37,726 55,915 41,982 48,046 68,774 46,672 44,514
66 - 70 33,054 32,062 30,988 31,491 32,729 32,679 36,179 36,992 36,419
50,111 49,527 28,524 35,601 32,804 37,202 35,994 58,410 32,973
> 70 23,863 28,699 22,374 22,339 25,764 24,942 25,443 26,252 28,155
29,298 57,289 21,898 20,231 26,238 29,862 23,228 24,959 31,805
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Table A.8: Real Percieved Value of Home by Age Group
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
24 - 35 57,742 65,005 70,118 84,270 88,601 73,377 66,936 66,319 73,485
38,288 45,223 42,536 59,098 59,668 44,210 43,599 45,050 50,429
31 - 35 82,596 84,954 95,086 109,080 114,972 102,213 90,549 91,030 90,516
59,962 113,795 72,011 89,977 89,230 81,042 55,730 71,123 73,472
36 - 40 96,006 103,443 113,087 142,550 142,700 114,953 110,564 104,450 110,599
88,126 83,561 117,978 164,074 129,977 119,300 95,447 91,112 84,243
41 - 45 88,858 105,886 118,467 137,737 150,806 129,878 111,802 109,727 108,454
67,335 107,566 112,334 128,583 159,604 120,622 85,981 82,892 86,889
46 - 50 100,822 105,680 108,787 136,563 143,602 123,577 120,335 126,071 116,970
103,548 89,709 92,715 143,270 154,686 126,879 108,373 128,214 118,903
51 - 55 105,223 114,940 121,128 142,341 145,734 122,390 119,546 109,855 118,839
131,148 149,853 103,776 138,512 138,811 105,391 120,655 109,342 116,561
56 - 60 85,891 96,815 118,639 149,658 160,090 126,642 126,856 115,299 107,336
66,035 85,987 165,520 189,624 217,647 122,074 135,046 115,679 100,480
61 - 65 90,009 95,004 109,959 121,056 133,121 131,699 135,712 122,231 124,694
80,693 82,031 114,100 112,845 119,452 202,475 245,095 113,049 147,120
66 - 70 85,039 94,338 102,378 127,467 132,363 110,585 113,654 124,707 133,327
79,046 85,593 92,282 128,784 128,376 104,927 118,836 263,406 229,189
> 70 76,889 85,043 92,165 114,334 129,190 108,728 104,895 107,215 107,905
69,274 74,414 83,418 107,770 118,597 99,337 92,825 108,617 111,382
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D Appendix - Estimation Results
In this section of the appendix we present additional results of robustness estimations not
presented in the main text and the full detail of the estimation results for the benchmark and
SHV models.
Appendix D.1 Additional Robustness Results
As robustness test for the benchmark model we re-estimated 1 using a sample of homeowners
only with small age groups. Results are presented in A.2. We also estimated the model with the
long sample. Results of the long sample with small age groups are shown in figure A.3. Finally,
for the SHV model we re-estimate the model with homeowners only. Results are displayed in
figures A.4 and A.5
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Age−Time Effects by Age and Year
Lifecycle 1998 2014: Benchmark Model
Figure A.2: Homeowners
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Long Sample, Age/Time Estimations
Figure A.3: Results from Long Data Set with age groups refined to smaller, 5 year, groups.
Top Time series by age group. Bottom Cross sectional lifecycle plots by year.
Appendix D.2 Full Estimation Results: Age-Time Effects with 4
Age Groups
Tables A.9 show the full results of the estimation of the benchmark model case 1 - Pooled
lifecycle with economic controls. Tables A.10 and A.11 show the full results of the estimation
of the benchmark model case 2 - Time Varying lifecycle with economic controls. Finally Tables
A.12 and A.13 show the full results of the estimation of the benchmark model case 2 - Time
Varying lifecycle with economic controls using a sample of homeowners only.
14
−.2
−.1
0
.1
.2
Lo
g 
De
via
tio
n 
fro
m
 G
ro
up
 1
−1
−.5
0
.5
Lo
g 
De
via
tio
n 
fro
m
 G
ro
up
 1
36−50 51−65 65+
19
98
20
00 20
02
20
04 20
06
20
08 20
10
20
12 20
14
19
98 20
00
20
02 20
04
20
06 20
08
20
10 20
12
20
14 19
98
20
00 20
02
20
04 20
06
20
08 20
10
20
12 20
14
−.05
0
.05
.1
Lo
g 
De
via
tio
n 
fro
m
 G
ro
up
 1
36−50 51−65 65+
19
98
20
00 20
02
20
04 20
06
20
08 20
10
20
12 20
14
19
98 20
00
20
02 20
04
20
06 20
08
20
10 20
12
20
14 19
98
20
00 20
02
20
04 20
06
20
08 20
10
20
12 20
14
Figure A.4: Age Group Evolution (Homeowners): Benchmark Model (Equation 2) and SHV
Model (Equation 4) with Economic Controls. Top Panel: βgt from Equation 2 (diamond) and
Equation 4 (dot); Bottom Panel: θi,gt,SHV , Equation 4
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Figure A.5: Evolution of Lifecycle (Homeowners): Benchmark Model (Equation 2) and SHV
Model (Equation 4) with Economic Controls, Whole Sample. Top Panel: βgt from Equation 2
(diamond) and Equation 4 (dot). Bottom Panel: θi,gt,SHV , Equation 4
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Appendix D.3 Estimation Results: Age-Time Effects with 10 Age
Groups
TO BE ADDED
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E Appendix - Simple model solution
We solve the models backwards from period 4 for an agent j. For simplicity we set t = z
and suppress one subscript from the notation, simplifying exposition. We assume R > Ept
pt−1
,
otherwise agents would like to short-sell an infinite amount of liquid assets.
Period 4 decision
max
c4,h4,a4
ln(c4) + ηln(h4) + ϕ4v(x4) + βφln(h4) (A.5)
st. c4 + h4p4 + a4 = y4 +Ra3 + p4h3 (A.6)
First order conditions imply
c4 =
(y4 +Ra3 + p4h3)
1 + (η + φβ)
(A.7)
h4p4 = c4(η + φβ) (A.8)
a4 = 0 (A.9)
Period 3 decision
max
c3,h3,a3
ln(c3) + ηln(h3) + ϕ3v(x3) + Eβ[γ4v(x4) + ln(c4) + ηln(h4) + ϕ4v(x4) + βφln(h4)]
(A.10)
st. c3 + h3p3 + a3 = y3 +Ra2 + p3h2 (A.11)
c4 =
(y4 +Ra3 + p4h3)
1 + (η + φβ)
(A.12)
h4p4 = c4(η + φβ) (A.13)
x4 = p4h3 − pr4h3 (A.14)
First order conditions imply13
E
c3βR
c4
= 1 (A.15)
h3p3 = ηc3
[
1− Ep4
p3
1
R
− β(ϕ+ γ)Ev′(x4)p4 − p
r
4
p3
]−1
= ηc3δ1 (A.16)
c3 ≈ Ey4 + y3 +R
2a2 +Rh2p3)
δ2
(A.17)
δ2 ≡ Rβ(1 + (η + φβ)) +R +
(
R− Ep4
p3
)
ηδ1 (A.18)
13We use the fact that all agents within a cohort are equal and thus c3c¯3 = 1. We assume E
[
1
c4
]
≈ 1E[c4] .
Including a second order term would imply that δ2 would also depend on the variance of c4. The same for δ5
and δ8.
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Period 2 decision
max
c2,h2,a2
ln(c2) + ηln(h2) + ϕ2v(x2,1) + E[βγ3v(x3,2) + β2γ4v(x4,2)] + . . . (A.19)
+Eβ[ln(c3) + ηln(h3) + ϕ3v(x3,2) + βγ4v(x4,3)] + . . . (A.20)
+Eβ2[ln(c4) + ηln(h4) + ϕ4v(x4,3) + βφln(h4)] (A.21)
st. c2 + h2p2 + a2 = y2 +Ra1 + p2h1 (A.22)
c4 =
(y4 +Ra3 + p4h3)
1 + (η + φβ)
(A.23)
c3 =
(Ey4 +Ry3 +R2a2 +Rh2p3))
δ2
(A.24)
h4p4 = c4(η + φβ) (A.25)
h3p3 = ηc3δ1 (A.26)
x4,2 = p4h3 − pr4,2h3, x4,3 = p4h3 − pr4,3h3 (A.27)
x3,2 = p3h2 − pr3,2h2 (A.28)
First order conditions imply
E
c2βRδ3
c3δ2
= 1 (A.29)
h2p2 = ηc2
[
1− Ep3
p2
1
R
− β(ϕ+ γ)Ev′(x3)p3 − p
r
3
p2
]−1
= ηc2δ4 (A.30)
c2 =
(E(y4 +Ry3) +R2y2 +R3a1 +R2h1p2))
δ5
(A.31)
δ3 ≡ Rβ(1 + (η + φβ)) +R(1 + η) + βRηδ1(ϕ+ γ)Ev′(x4,3)
p4 − pr4,3
p3
+ . . .
+βRηδ1γEv′(x4,2)
p4 − pr4,2
p3
(A.32)
δ5 ≡ R
(
βδ3 +R +
(
R− Ep3
p2
)
ηδ4
)
(A.33)
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Period 1 decision
max
c1,h1,a1
ln(c1) + ηln(h1) + ϕ1v(x1,0) + E[βγ2v(x2,1) + β2γ3v(x3,1) + β3γ4v(x4,1)] (A.34)
Eβ[ln(c2) + ηln(h2) + ϕ2v(x2,1) + [βγ3v(x3,2) + β2γ4v(x4,2)]] + . . . (A.35)
+Eβ2[ln(c3) + ηln(h3) + ϕ3v(x3,2) + βγ4v(x4,3)] + . . . (A.36)
+Eβ3[ln(c4) + ηln(h4) + ϕ4v(x4,3) + βφln(h4)] (A.37)
st. c1 + h1p1 + a1 = y1 + p1h0 (A.38)
c4 =
(y4 +Ra3 + p4h3)
1 + (η + φβ)
(A.39)
c3 =
(Ey4 +Ry3 +R2a2 +Rh2p3))
δ2
(A.40)
c2 =
(E(y4 +Ry3) +R2y2 +R3a1 +R2h1p2))
δ5
(A.41)
h4p4 = c4(η + φβ) (A.42)
h3p3 = ηc3δ1 (A.43)
h2p2 = ηc2δ4 (A.44)
x4,1 = p4h3 − pr4,1h3, x4,2 = p4h3 − pr4,2h3, x4,3 = p4h3 − pr4,3h3 (A.45)
x3,1 = p3h2 − pr3,1h2, x3,2 = p3h2 − pr3,2h2 (A.46)
x2,1 = p2h1 − pr2,1h1 (A.47)
First order conditions imply
1 = E
c2βRδ6
c3δ5
(A.48)
h1p1 = ηc1
[
1− Ep2
p1
1
R
− β(ϕ+ γ)Ev′(x2)p2 − p
r
2
p1
]−1
= ηc1δ7 (A.49)
c1 =
(E(y4 +Ry3 +R2y2) + y1 +R3h0p1))
δ8
(A.50)
δ6 ≡ R2β2(1 + (η + φβ)) +R2(1 + β)(1 + η) + . . .
+βR2ηδ4
(
(ϕ+ γ)Ev′(x3,2)
p3 − pr3,2
p2
+ γEv′(x3,1)
p3 − pr3,1
p2
)
+ . . . (A.51)
+β2R2ηδ1
(
(ϕ+ γ)Ev′(x4,3)
p4 − pr4,3
p3
+ γEv′(x4,2)
p4 − pr4,2
p3
+ γEv′(x4,1)
p4 − pr4,1
p3
)
δ8 ≡ R
(
βδ6 +R
2 +R
(
R− Ep3
p2
)
ηδ4
)
(A.52)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lifecycle Model (All) Lifecycle Model with Econ Controls (All) Lifecycle Model (HO) Lifecycle Model with Econ Controls (HO)
A2 0.100∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0747∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0720∗∗∗ (0.000)
A3 0.0965∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0704∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0727∗∗∗ (0.000)
A4 0.0322 (0.158) 0.0243 (0.257) 0.0368 (0.058) 0.0148 (0.404)
t2000 0.0484∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0292∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0453∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0192∗∗ (0.002)
t2002 0.0584∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0335∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0707∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0276∗∗∗ (0.000)
t2004 0.0687∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0207∗ (0.015) 0.117∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0382∗∗∗ (0.000)
t2006 0.0506∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.00733 (0.452) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0122 (0.150)
t2008 -0.0528∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0968∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.00137 (0.884) -0.0700∗∗∗ (0.000)
t2010 -0.0271∗ (0.019) -0.0640∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0101 (0.323) -0.0483∗∗∗ (0.000)
t2012 -0.0652∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.104∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.00871 (0.427) -0.0680∗∗∗ (0.000)
t2014 -0.0513∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.101∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.00281 (0.813) -0.0714∗∗∗ (0.000)
Marital -0.000265 (0.968) 0.00816 (0.157) 0.0115 (0.073) 0.0137∗ (0.015)
NAdults -0.137∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0857∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.147∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0699∗∗∗ (0.000)
NChildren -0.155∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.113∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.155∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.103∗∗∗ (0.000)
White -0.0552 (0.136) -0.0566 (0.090) -0.0189 (0.564) -0.0260 (0.351)
Black 0.122 (0.181) 0.120 (0.186) 0.00735 (0.929) 0.0239 (0.737)
State 2 0.358∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.287∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.339∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.189∗ (0.030)
State 3 0.167 (0.122) 0.143 (0.168) 0.282∗∗ (0.009) 0.147 (0.202)
State 4 0.546∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.454∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.240∗∗ (0.007)
State 5 0.428∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.354∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.361∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.188∗ (0.031)
State 6 0.359∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.311∗∗ (0.004) 0.290 (0.104) 0.212 (0.093)
State 7 0.365∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.297∗∗ (0.002) 0.311∗∗ (0.006) 0.175 (0.143)
State 8 0.311∗∗ (0.004) 0.234∗ (0.023) 0.0780 (0.538) -0.00460 (0.972)
State 9 0.235∗∗ (0.001) 0.220∗∗ (0.003) 0.227∗ (0.013) 0.184∗ (0.024)
State 10 0.318∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.280∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.132 (0.194) 0.0801 (0.356)
State 11 0.183 (0.149) 0.241 (0.059) -0.00602 (0.961) -0.0131 (0.914)
State 12 0.330∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.290∗∗ (0.002) 0.352∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.200∗ (0.024)
State 13 0.0695 (0.421) 0.0282 (0.746) 0.126 (0.276) 0.0307 (0.756)
State 14 0.119 (0.167) 0.127 (0.144) 0.174 (0.108) 0.138 (0.170)
State 15 0.172 (0.102) 0.188 (0.068) -0.0531 (0.667) 0.0901 (0.431)
State 16 0.0325 (0.746) -0.0179 (0.858) 0.173 (0.142) 0.112 (0.246)
State 17 -0.0768 (0.530) -0.0680 (0.590) 0.278 (0.098) 0.287 (0.110)
State 18 0.459∗∗ (0.006) 0.309 (0.058) 0.829∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.539∗∗∗ (0.000)
State 19 0.437∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.312∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.347∗∗ (0.004) 0.195∗ (0.039)
State 20 0.368∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.321∗∗ (0.001) 0.409∗ (0.013) 0.217 (0.143)
State 21 0.236∗∗ (0.005) 0.192∗ (0.019) 0.0738 (0.497) -0.00462 (0.960)
State 22 0.479∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.409∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.344∗∗ (0.004) 0.215∗ (0.027)
State 23 0.361∗∗ (0.003) 0.303∗ (0.015) 0.0899 (0.517) -0.00626 (0.955)
State 24 0.199∗ (0.026) 0.190∗ (0.016) 0.137 (0.227) 0.0534 (0.560)
State 25 0.291∗ (0.012) 0.238∗ (0.035) 0.480∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.274∗ (0.013)
State 26 0.130 (0.158) 0.0747 (0.417) 0.138 (0.190) -0.0419 (0.698)
State 27 0.458∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.409∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.414∗∗ (0.004) 0.271∗ (0.019)
State 28 0.504∗∗ (0.001) 0.360∗ (0.018) 0.464∗ (0.032) 0.201 (0.215)
State 29 0.372∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.290∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.298∗∗ (0.002) 0.175∗ (0.036)
State 30 0.413∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.309∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.320∗ (0.016) 0.179 (0.083)
State 31 0.376∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.350∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.268∗ (0.011) 0.200∗ (0.021)
State 32 0.275∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.250∗∗ (0.001) 0.0833 (0.414) 0.0667 (0.466)
State 33 0.565∗∗ (0.003) 0.513∗∗ (0.001) 0.973∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.347∗∗∗ (0.001)
State 34 0.270∗∗ (0.005) 0.244∗∗ (0.009) 0.112 (0.263) 0.0451 (0.605)
State 35 0.109 (0.381) 0.0353 (0.768) -0.0917 (0.504) -0.261∗ (0.043)
State 36 0.313∗∗ (0.002) 0.254∗∗ (0.006) 0.383∗∗ (0.002) 0.245∗∗ (0.009)
State 37 0.351∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.302∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.236∗ (0.024) 0.130 (0.144)
State 38 0.589∗∗ (0.005) 0.532∗∗ (0.006) 0.215 (0.192) -0.0748 (0.616)
State 39 0.271∗∗ (0.002) 0.244∗∗ (0.006) 0.139 (0.181) 0.112 (0.235)
State 40 0.234 (0.051) 0.228∗ (0.029) 0.244 (0.109) 0.204 (0.082)
State 41 0.310∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.218∗∗ (0.005) 0.250∗∗ (0.001) 0.144∗ (0.047)
State 42 0.381∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.323∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.235∗ (0.029) 0.160 (0.084)
State 43 0.377∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.309∗∗ (0.002) 0.328∗ (0.049) 0.213 (0.079)
State 44 0.120 (0.480) 0.0419 (0.774) 0.173 (0.574) 0.206 (0.268)
State 45 0.341∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.248∗∗ (0.001) 0.289∗∗ (0.002) 0.108 (0.194)
State 46 0.356∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.340∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.322∗ (0.018) 0.261∗∗ (0.009)
State 47 0.498∗∗ (0.002) 0.494∗∗ (0.005) 0.216 (0.151) 0.165 (0.286)
State 48 0.222∗ (0.018) 0.147 (0.106) 0.199∗ (0.039) 0.0569 (0.535)
State 49 0.346∗∗ (0.003) 0.227 (0.061) 0.118 (0.551) -0.194 (0.232)
State 50 0.408∗∗ (0.002) 0.313∗ (0.010) 0.516∗∗ (0.005) 0.328∗∗ (0.002)
State 51 0.600∗∗ (0.004) 0.533∗∗ (0.007) 0.478∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.260∗∗ (0.003)
ES 2 -0.167∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.136∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0679∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0536∗∗∗ (0.000)
ES 3 -0.125∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0759∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0803∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0503∗∗∗ (0.000)
ES 4 -0.180∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.142∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.00618 (0.844) 0.0138 (0.646)
ES 5 0.0634 (0.067) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.0236 (0.582) 0.0618 (0.144)
ES 6 -0.138 (0.202) -0.0633 (0.471) 0.0505 (0.308) 0.0676 (0.150)
Limit -0.0300∗∗ (0.003) -0.0164 (0.072) -0.00140 (0.861) 0.00362 (0.614)
Income 0.123∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0648∗∗∗ (0.000)
H 0.195∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.251∗∗∗ (0.000)
Observations 42427 42303 28269 28247
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.196 0.188 0.301
AIC 27172.3 22590.8 -3127.2 -7363.8
BIC 27812.8 23248.4 -2541.5 -6761.6
p-values in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.9: Case 1 - Pooled lifecycle
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benchmark Benchmark w Income SHE Model SHE Model w Income SHV Model SHV Model w Income
t2000 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2002 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2004 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.04 (0.06) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗ (0.01)
t2006 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03 (0.12) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗ (0.00) 0.04∗ (0.02)
t2008 0.03 (0.19) -0.05∗ (0.02) 0.03 (0.14) 0.01 (0.57) -0.02 (0.45) -0.03 (0.13)
t2010 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02 (0.30) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗ (0.01) 0.04 (0.07)
t2012 0.08∗∗ (0.00) -0.01 (0.68) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗ (0.02) 0.03 (0.22) 0.01 (0.70)
t2014 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02 (0.55) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗ (0.01) 0.04 (0.12)
Marital -0.01 (0.44) 0.00 (0.39) -0.00 (0.64) -0.00 (0.83) 0.00 (0.52) 0.01 (0.34)
NAdults -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.00)
NChildren -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
White -0.05 (0.14) -0.06 (0.10) -0.04 (0.31) -0.04 (0.27) -0.04 (0.19) -0.05 (0.16)
Black 0.11 (0.21) 0.12 (0.20) 0.14 (0.12) 0.12 (0.17) 0.15 (0.10) 0.13 (0.14)
State 2 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 3 0.17 (0.13) 0.14 (0.18) 0.16 (0.14) 0.16 (0.14) 0.13 (0.22) 0.13 (0.20)
State 4 0.53∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.52∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.49∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.46∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 5 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 6 0.34∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗ (0.01) 0.33∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗ (0.01) 0.32∗∗ (0.00)
State 7 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗ (0.00)
State 8 0.30∗∗ (0.00) 0.23∗ (0.03) 0.28∗∗ (0.01) 0.23∗ (0.03) 0.26∗∗ (0.01) 0.22∗ (0.03)
State 9 0.23∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗ (0.00) 0.23∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗ (0.00)
State 10 0.31∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 11 0.17 (0.16) 0.23 (0.06) 0.15 (0.26) 0.17 (0.19) 0.18 (0.13) 0.21 (0.09)
State 12 0.32∗∗ (0.00) 0.28∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.27∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗ (0.00)
State 13 0.06 (0.52) 0.02 (0.83) 0.06 (0.44) 0.05 (0.59) 0.04 (0.62) 0.03 (0.74)
State 14 0.12 (0.16) 0.13 (0.14) 0.12 (0.14) 0.12 (0.15) 0.13 (0.11) 0.14 (0.11)
State 15 0.16 (0.12) 0.18 (0.08) 0.17 (0.10) 0.14 (0.17) 0.21∗ (0.03) 0.19 (0.06)
State 16 0.02 (0.85) -0.03 (0.79) -0.00 (0.97) -0.02 (0.83) -0.03 (0.76) -0.04 (0.66)
State 17 -0.08 (0.49) -0.07 (0.55) -0.09 (0.48) -0.08 (0.49) -0.07 (0.56) -0.07 (0.59)
State 18 0.44∗∗ (0.01) 0.30 (0.06) 0.40∗ (0.02) 0.33 (0.05) 0.33 (0.05) 0.27 (0.11)
State 19 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 20 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗ (0.00) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗ (0.00)
State 21 0.23∗∗ (0.01) 0.18∗ (0.03) 0.21∗ (0.01) 0.20∗ (0.02) 0.19∗ (0.02) 0.18∗ (0.03)
State 22 0.46∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.46∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.45∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 23 0.35∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗ (0.02) 0.35∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗ (0.01) 0.31∗ (0.01) 0.30∗ (0.01)
State 24 0.20∗ (0.03) 0.19∗ (0.02) 0.19∗ (0.04) 0.21∗∗ (0.01) 0.16 (0.07) 0.19∗ (0.02)
State 25 0.30∗ (0.01) 0.24∗ (0.04) 0.34∗∗ (0.01) 0.30∗ (0.01) 0.31∗ (0.02) 0.28∗ (0.02)
State 26 0.13 (0.16) 0.07 (0.43) 0.11 (0.21) 0.11 (0.20) 0.07 (0.42) 0.08 (0.38)
State 27 0.45∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.45∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 28 0.51∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗ (0.02) 0.47∗∗ (0.00) 0.43∗∗ (0.01) 0.38∗∗ (0.01) 0.35∗ (0.02)
State 29 0.37∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 30 0.40∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 31 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 32 0.26∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00)
State 33 0.57∗∗ (0.01) 0.51∗∗ (0.00) 0.51∗∗ (0.00) 0.53∗∗ (0.00) 0.44∗∗ (0.01) 0.47∗∗ (0.00)
State 34 0.26∗∗ (0.01) 0.24∗ (0.01) 0.26∗∗ (0.01) 0.25∗∗ (0.01) 0.25∗∗ (0.01) 0.24∗∗ (0.01)
State 35 0.10 (0.44) 0.03 (0.82) 0.08 (0.50) 0.08 (0.52) 0.02 (0.84) 0.02 (0.84)
State 36 0.30∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.01) 0.28∗∗ (0.00) 0.27∗∗ (0.00) 0.23∗ (0.01) 0.23∗ (0.01)
State 37 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 38 0.59∗∗ (0.01) 0.53∗∗ (0.01) 0.53∗ (0.01) 0.52∗ (0.01) 0.50∗∗ (0.01) 0.49∗ (0.01)
State 39 0.27∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.01) 0.27∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗ (0.00) 0.26∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗ (0.00)
State 40 0.21 (0.08) 0.21∗ (0.05) 0.23∗ (0.05) 0.23 (0.06) 0.23∗ (0.02) 0.23∗ (0.03)
State 41 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.21∗∗ (0.01) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.23∗∗ (0.00) 0.21∗∗ (0.01)
State 42 0.37∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 43 0.37∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.31∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.31∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗ (0.00)
State 44 0.09 (0.55) 0.02 (0.86) 0.08 (0.65) 0.05 (0.74) 0.05 (0.75) 0.03 (0.84)
State 45 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 46 0.35∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 47 0.49∗∗ (0.00) 0.49∗∗ (0.00) 0.49∗∗ (0.00) 0.52∗∗ (0.00) 0.47∗∗ (0.00) 0.50∗∗ (0.00)
State 48 0.20∗ (0.03) 0.13 (0.14) 0.20∗ (0.03) 0.18∗ (0.05) 0.16 (0.08) 0.14 (0.12)
State 49 0.33∗∗ (0.00) 0.22 (0.07) 0.31∗ (0.01) 0.29∗ (0.02) 0.22 (0.09) 0.20 (0.11)
State 50 0.38∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗ (0.01) 0.40∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗ (0.00) 0.32∗∗ (0.01)
State 51 0.61∗∗ (0.00) 0.54∗∗ (0.01) 0.59∗∗ (0.00) 0.54∗∗ (0.00) 0.56∗∗ (0.00) 0.52∗∗ (0.01)
ES 2 -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00)
ES 3 -0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00)
ES 4 -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00)
ES 5 0.07∗ (0.04) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗ (0.04) 0.11∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗ (0.01) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00)
ES 6 -0.13 (0.23) -0.06 (0.51) -0.14 (0.20) -0.07 (0.46) -0.14 (0.20) -0.06 (0.47)
Limit -0.03∗∗ (0.01) -0.01 (0.10) -0.03∗∗ (0.01) -0.02 (0.10) -0.02∗ (0.02) -0.01 (0.13)
Income 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
H 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00)
HE 0.01∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.01∗∗∗ (0.00)
Observations 42427 42303 42427 42303 42427 42303
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.199 0.148 0.175 0.184 0.209
AIC 26907.55 22444.78 26066.97 23713.17 24211.90 21911.98
BIC 27755.79 23310.04 27157.57 24812.05 25302.50 23010.87
p-values in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.10: Case 2 - Time Varying lifecycle
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benchmark Benchmark w Income SHE Model SHE Model w Income SHV Model SHV Model w Income
A2t1998 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00)
A2t2000 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.04∗ (0.03) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗ (0.00)
A2t2002 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗ (0.01) 0.10∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗ (0.01)
A2t2004 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.04 (0.19) 0.02 (0.51) 0.02 (0.48) 0.00 (0.97)
A2t2006 0.06∗∗ (0.00) 0.04∗ (0.01) -0.02 (0.50) -0.02 (0.54) -0.03 (0.35) -0.03 (0.41)
A2t2008 0.03 (0.20) 0.02 (0.22) -0.05 (0.12) -0.05 (0.10) -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.07)
A2t2010 -0.01 (0.63) 0.00 (0.91) -0.06∗ (0.03) -0.06∗ (0.03) -0.07∗ (0.03) -0.06∗ (0.03)
A2t2012 0.01 (0.74) 0.02 (0.28) -0.06 (0.07) -0.05 (0.07) -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.07)
A2t2014 -0.01 (0.53) 0.01 (0.62) -0.07∗ (0.03) -0.07∗ (0.02) -0.05 (0.13) -0.05 (0.11)
A3t1998 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗ (0.01) 0.14∗∗ (0.01) 0.09 (0.07)
A3t2000 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗ (0.01) 0.08 (0.11)
A3t2002 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗ (0.03) 0.06 (0.13) 0.04 (0.33) 0.00 (0.93) -0.02 (0.71)
A3t2004 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03 (0.37) 0.02 (0.61) 0.02 (0.63) 0.00 (0.94)
A3t2006 0.07∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗ (0.02) -0.06 (0.15) -0.06 (0.15) -0.06 (0.15) -0.07 (0.13)
A3t2008 0.05 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) -0.03 (0.39) -0.03 (0.33) -0.05 (0.30) -0.05 (0.25)
A3t2010 -0.03 (0.17) -0.03 (0.26) -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.13∗∗ (0.00) -0.13∗∗ (0.00)
A3t2012 -0.06∗ (0.02) -0.04 (0.13) -0.20∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.21∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.20∗∗∗ (0.00)
A3t2014 -0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.08∗∗ (0.01) -0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.29∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.29∗∗∗ (0.00)
A4t1998 0.28∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.21∗ (0.01) 0.16 (0.05) 0.15 (0.10) 0.10 (0.25)
A4t2000 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00) 0.19∗ (0.02)
A4t2002 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗ (0.04) 0.11 (0.11) 0.10 (0.19) 0.07 (0.34)
A4t2004 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02 (0.81) -0.02 (0.71) -0.04 (0.55) -0.08 (0.25)
A4t2006 0.10∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗ (0.02) -0.20∗ (0.01) -0.22∗∗ (0.01) -0.24∗∗ (0.01) -0.26∗∗ (0.00)
A4t2008 0.05 (0.08) 0.05 (0.06) -0.15∗ (0.04) -0.18∗ (0.01) -0.16∗ (0.04) -0.19∗ (0.01)
A4t2010 -0.06 (0.06) -0.04 (0.15) -0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.33∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.34∗∗∗ (0.00)
A4t2012 -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.08∗∗ (0.00) -0.45∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.54∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.51∗∗∗ (0.00)
A4t2014 -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.40∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.38∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.40∗∗∗ (0.00)
Observations 42427 42303 42427 42303 42427 42303
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.199 0.148 0.175 0.184 0.209
AIC 26907.55 22444.78 26066.97 23713.17 24211.90 21911.98
BIC 27755.79 23310.04 27157.57 24812.05 25302.50 23010.87
p-values in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.11: Age-Time Effects: Case 2 - Time Varying lifecycle
22
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benchmark Benchmark w Income SHE Model SHE Model w Income SHV Model SHV Model w Income
t2000 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03 (0.09) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03∗ (0.04) 0.03 (0.06)
t2002 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.00) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.00)
t2004 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2006 0.20∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗ (0.00) 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2008 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.01 (0.50) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.01 (0.68) -0.00 (0.89)
t2010 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.04∗ (0.04) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗ (0.01)
t2012 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗ (0.03) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗ (0.01)
t2014 0.23∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗ (0.02) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗ (0.00)
Marital 0.01 (0.26) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.24) 0.01 (0.20) 0.01∗ (0.04) 0.01∗ (0.04)
NAdults -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.08∗∗∗ (0.00)
NChildren -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.11∗∗∗ (0.00)
White -0.02 (0.46) -0.03 (0.31) -0.01 (0.65) -0.02 (0.62) -0.02 (0.37) -0.03 (0.35)
Black -0.01 (0.92) 0.02 (0.83) -0.01 (0.94) -0.01 (0.94) 0.03 (0.67) 0.02 (0.72)
State 2 0.31∗∗ (0.00) 0.17 (0.05) 0.32∗∗ (0.00) 0.31∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗ (0.03) 0.17∗ (0.05)
State 3 0.27∗ (0.01) 0.14 (0.23) 0.27∗∗ (0.01) 0.25∗ (0.02) 0.11 (0.28) 0.12 (0.29)
State 4 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.23∗ (0.01) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00)
State 5 0.34∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗ (0.05) 0.33∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗ (0.02) 0.18∗ (0.03)
State 6 0.24 (0.17) 0.17 (0.16) 0.21 (0.20) 0.20 (0.22) 0.18 (0.10) 0.19 (0.10)
State 7 0.27∗ (0.02) 0.14 (0.23) 0.25∗ (0.04) 0.24 (0.05) 0.13 (0.26) 0.13 (0.27)
State 8 0.05 (0.72) -0.03 (0.85) 0.03 (0.82) 0.01 (0.94) -0.08 (0.55) -0.08 (0.58)
State 9 0.21∗ (0.02) 0.17∗ (0.04) 0.20∗ (0.03) 0.19∗ (0.04) 0.15∗ (0.03) 0.16∗ (0.04)
State 10 0.11 (0.28) 0.06 (0.46) 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.36) 0.05 (0.52) 0.06 (0.51)
State 11 -0.02 (0.90) -0.02 (0.86) -0.04 (0.78) -0.03 (0.85) -0.06 (0.58) -0.04 (0.76)
State 12 0.33∗∗ (0.00) 0.19∗ (0.04) 0.32∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗∗ (0.01) 0.18∗ (0.02) 0.18∗ (0.04)
State 13 0.10 (0.40) 0.01 (0.90) 0.09 (0.44) 0.06 (0.60) 0.01 (0.89) 0.01 (0.91)
State 14 0.17 (0.12) 0.13 (0.19) 0.16 (0.14) 0.15 (0.18) 0.12 (0.19) 0.12 (0.20)
State 15 -0.07 (0.59) 0.08 (0.51) -0.07 (0.56) -0.09 (0.47) 0.07 (0.51) 0.07 (0.53)
State 16 0.15 (0.21) 0.09 (0.33) 0.14 (0.24) 0.13 (0.26) 0.08 (0.36) 0.09 (0.34)
State 17 0.25 (0.13) 0.27 (0.13) 0.26 (0.12) 0.25 (0.14) 0.28 (0.12) 0.29 (0.12)
State 18 0.76∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.50∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.76∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.74∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.50∗∗ (0.00) 0.51∗∗ (0.00)
State 19 0.31∗ (0.01) 0.17 (0.07) 0.29∗ (0.02) 0.25∗ (0.03) 0.17∗ (0.04) 0.16 (0.07)
State 20 0.38∗ (0.02) 0.20 (0.17) 0.38∗ (0.02) 0.34∗ (0.03) 0.23 (0.10) 0.22 (0.13)
State 21 0.05 (0.64) -0.02 (0.81) 0.05 (0.65) 0.04 (0.74) -0.03 (0.70) -0.02 (0.79)
State 22 0.33∗∗ (0.01) 0.20∗ (0.04) 0.32∗∗ (0.01) 0.31∗∗ (0.01) 0.18∗ (0.04) 0.19∗ (0.04)
State 23 0.08 (0.57) -0.01 (0.92) 0.08 (0.58) 0.06 (0.65) 0.01 (0.92) 0.01 (0.89)
State 24 0.12 (0.31) 0.04 (0.68) 0.09 (0.41) 0.09 (0.43) -0.00 (1.00) 0.02 (0.86)
State 25 0.47∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.26∗ (0.02) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.41∗∗ (0.00) 0.23∗ (0.02) 0.23∗ (0.03)
State 26 0.11 (0.29) -0.06 (0.58) 0.09 (0.40) 0.06 (0.55) -0.07 (0.43) -0.07 (0.50)
State 27 0.39∗∗ (0.01) 0.25∗ (0.03) 0.41∗∗ (0.00) 0.39∗∗ (0.01) 0.26∗ (0.02) 0.26∗ (0.02)
State 28 0.44∗ (0.04) 0.19 (0.25) 0.41 (0.05) 0.38 (0.09) 0.15 (0.27) 0.15 (0.32)
State 29 0.28∗∗ (0.00) 0.16 (0.05) 0.27∗∗ (0.01) 0.24∗ (0.01) 0.15∗ (0.04) 0.15 (0.07)
State 30 0.28∗ (0.04) 0.16 (0.15) 0.29∗ (0.03) 0.25 (0.05) 0.16 (0.09) 0.15 (0.13)
State 31 0.25∗ (0.02) 0.19∗ (0.03) 0.25∗ (0.02) 0.24∗ (0.02) 0.18∗ (0.02) 0.19∗ (0.03)
State 32 0.06 (0.53) 0.05 (0.57) 0.05 (0.62) 0.02 (0.83) 0.04 (0.60) 0.04 (0.67)
State 33 1.01∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.95∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 34 0.09 (0.38) 0.03 (0.74) 0.08 (0.41) 0.07 (0.50) 0.02 (0.77) 0.03 (0.72)
State 35 -0.13 (0.36) -0.29∗ (0.03) -0.15 (0.30) -0.17 (0.24) -0.26∗ (0.03) -0.25∗ (0.05)
State 36 0.35∗∗ (0.01) 0.22∗ (0.02) 0.33∗∗ (0.01) 0.33∗ (0.01) 0.20∗ (0.01) 0.22∗ (0.02)
State 37 0.21∗ (0.05) 0.11 (0.22) 0.19 (0.07) 0.19 (0.07) 0.08 (0.34) 0.09 (0.30)
State 38 0.18 (0.27) -0.10 (0.50) 0.15 (0.35) 0.19 (0.25) -0.12 (0.39) -0.07 (0.64)
State 39 0.13 (0.23) 0.10 (0.28) 0.12 (0.24) 0.09 (0.39) 0.10 (0.23) 0.09 (0.32)
State 40 0.20 (0.20) 0.17 (0.15) 0.19 (0.19) 0.18 (0.23) 0.13 (0.18) 0.14 (0.20)
State 41 0.23∗∗ (0.00) 0.13 (0.08) 0.21∗∗ (0.01) 0.21∗ (0.01) 0.10 (0.12) 0.11 (0.13)
State 42 0.21 (0.05) 0.14 (0.13) 0.21 (0.05) 0.19 (0.08) 0.12 (0.11) 0.13 (0.15)
State 43 0.31 (0.07) 0.20 (0.10) 0.32∗ (0.05) 0.30 (0.06) 0.19 (0.09) 0.20 (0.09)
State 44 0.12 (0.66) 0.16 (0.33) 0.11 (0.70) 0.07 (0.76) 0.17 (0.41) 0.15 (0.38)
State 45 0.26∗∗ (0.01) 0.09 (0.29) 0.26∗∗ (0.01) 0.24∗ (0.01) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.28)
State 46 0.31∗ (0.02) 0.25∗ (0.01) 0.29∗ (0.03) 0.29∗ (0.02) 0.23∗ (0.01) 0.24∗ (0.01)
State 47 0.22 (0.15) 0.16 (0.30) 0.24 (0.14) 0.23 (0.13) 0.17 (0.29) 0.19 (0.26)
State 48 0.18 (0.07) 0.04 (0.64) 0.17 (0.08) 0.15 (0.11) 0.04 (0.64) 0.05 (0.62)
State 49 0.09 (0.66) -0.21 (0.21) 0.06 (0.76) 0.05 (0.81) -0.26 (0.08) -0.25 (0.11)
State 50 0.47∗∗ (0.01) 0.30∗∗ (0.00) 0.45∗∗ (0.01) 0.41∗ (0.01) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗ (0.00)
State 51 0.49∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.26∗∗ (0.00) 0.47∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.27∗∗ (0.00)
ES 2 -0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.05∗∗∗ (0.00)
ES 3 -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.03∗∗∗ (0.00)
ES 4 0.00 (0.97) 0.02 (0.53) 0.00 (0.93) 0.02 (0.52) 0.01 (0.81) 0.02 (0.51)
ES 5 -0.01 (0.83) 0.07 (0.11) -0.01 (0.85) 0.02 (0.67) 0.05 (0.25) 0.07 (0.12)
ES 6 0.06 (0.26) 0.07 (0.13) 0.05 (0.33) 0.05 (0.30) 0.07 (0.15) 0.07 (0.14)
Limit 0.00 (0.88) 0.00 (0.49) 0.00 (0.84) 0.00 (0.58) 0.00 (0.59) 0.01 (0.42)
Income 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00)
H 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.00)
HE 0.01∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.01∗∗∗ (0.00)
Observations 28269 28247 28269 28247 28269 28247
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.306 0.209 0.222 0.308 0.315
AIC -3454.40 -7538.89 -3835.72 -4284.71 -7604.89 -7898.53
BIC -2670.70 -6738.77 -2821.02 -3261.87 -6590.20 -6875.69
p-values in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.12: Case 2 - Time Varying lifecycle (Sample: Homeowners only)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benchmark Benchmark w Income SHE Model SHE Model w Income SHV Model SHV Model w Income
A2t1998 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.45∗ (0.03) 0.43∗ (0.04)
A2t2000 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗ (0.00) 0.29 (0.07) 0.25 (0.11)
A2t2002 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.00) 0.06 (0.16) 0.05 (0.26) -0.04 (0.80) -0.08 (0.63)
A2t2004 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03∗ (0.03) 0.01 (0.81) 0.02 (0.72) -0.41∗∗ (0.01) -0.42∗∗ (0.00)
A2t2006 0.04∗ (0.02) 0.03 (0.07) -0.02 (0.57) -0.02 (0.58) -0.74∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.76∗∗∗ (0.00)
A2t2008 0.02 (0.32) 0.02 (0.20) -0.01 (0.86) -0.00 (0.92) -0.59∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.60∗∗∗ (0.00)
A2t2010 -0.00 (0.83) 0.00 (0.83) -0.02 (0.61) -0.02 (0.65) -0.69∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.69∗∗∗ (0.00)
A2t2012 -0.01 (0.57) 0.00 (0.99) -0.02 (0.66) -0.01 (0.80) -0.64∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.63∗∗∗ (0.00)
A2t2014 -0.03 (0.26) -0.00 (0.84) -0.14∗∗ (0.01) -0.13∗ (0.01) -0.83∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.83∗∗∗ (0.00)
A3t1998 0.20∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.19∗∗ (0.00) 0.16 (0.64) 0.13 (0.68)
A3t2000 0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗ (0.00) 0.04 (0.85) 0.02 (0.94)
A3t2002 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.21 (0.29) -0.24 (0.23)
A3t2004 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.88) 0.02 (0.73) -0.39∗ (0.04) -0.39∗ (0.05)
A3t2006 0.04 (0.08) 0.02 (0.19) -0.12∗ (0.03) -0.11 (0.06) -1.01∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.01∗∗∗ (0.00)
A3t2008 0.01 (0.73) 0.01 (0.64) -0.02 (0.66) -0.02 (0.72) -0.58∗∗ (0.00) -0.59∗∗ (0.00)
A3t2010 -0.05∗ (0.02) -0.04∗ (0.04) -0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.54∗∗ (0.00) -0.54∗∗ (0.00)
A3t2012 -0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.07∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗ (0.01) -0.12∗ (0.03) -0.67∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.65∗∗∗ (0.00)
A3t2014 -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.08∗∗ (0.00) -0.26∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.24∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.79∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.78∗∗∗ (0.00)
A4t1998 0.24∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗ (0.03) 0.29∗ (0.03) 0.43 (0.27) 0.36 (0.35)
A4t2000 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.19∗∗ (0.01) 0.15∗ (0.04) 0.48 (0.22) 0.39 (0.30)
A4t2002 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.05 (0.72) -0.07 (0.59) -0.15 (0.62) -0.21 (0.49)
A4t2004 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗ (0.00) -0.11 (0.16) -0.12 (0.12) -0.35 (0.17) -0.40 (0.11)
A4t2006 0.06∗ (0.02) 0.05∗ (0.05) -0.17 (0.07) -0.18 (0.05) -0.77∗∗ (0.01) -0.81∗∗ (0.00)
A4t2008 0.01 (0.75) 0.02 (0.42) -0.07 (0.43) -0.08 (0.39) -0.47 (0.08) -0.53 (0.05)
A4t2010 -0.07∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗ (0.03) -0.21∗∗ (0.01) -0.20∗∗ (0.01) -0.76∗∗ (0.00) -0.77∗∗ (0.00)
A4t2012 -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.19∗ (0.03) -0.17∗ (0.04) -0.87∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.89∗∗∗ (0.00)
A4t2014 -0.21∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.27∗∗ (0.00) -0.25∗∗ (0.01) -0.95∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.96∗∗∗ (0.00)
Observations 28269 28247 28269 28247 28269 28247
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.306 0.209 0.222 0.308 0.315
AIC -3454.40 -7538.89 -3835.72 -4284.71 -7604.89 -7898.53
BIC -2670.70 -6738.77 -2821.02 -3261.87 -6590.20 -6875.69
p-values in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.13: Age-Time Effects: Case 2 - Time Varying lifecycle (Sample: Homeowners only):
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